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Developing Countries: Lessons 
from the Bretton Woods Era 
Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
In  1973, the international monetary system forged in Bretton Woods experi- 
enced a final collapse, as the industrial nations abandoned all efforts to sustain 
a fixed exchange rate regime and decided to adopt freely floating exchange 
rates. In spite of this significant change in the international financial system, 
throughout the 1970s most of the developing countries continued to rely heav- 
ily on fixed exchange rates, mainly pegging to specific countries within the 
spirit of  an optimum currency area. For example, the December 1979 issue of 
International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS) reports that  85%  of  the developing 
countries had some sort of fixed exchange rate system at that time. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, an increasing number of devel- 
oping countries moved  away from fixed exchange rates and adopted more 
flexible regimes. According to the December 1990 issue of IFS, the propor- 
tion of less developed countries (LDCs) that had some type of  fixed exchange 
rate had declined to 67%. This movement toward greater exchange rate flexi- 
bility was, to a considerable extent, associated with the debt crisis unleashed 
in 1982. Those countries that had to cope with sudden cuts in external financ- 
ing had very limited policy options. In an effort to engineer gigantic resource 
transfers to their creditors, most of these countries adopted adjustment pack- 
ages that included, as an  important component, the abandonment of fixed rate 
practices. It is in this context that, in the mid-l980s, we saw the end of long 
experiences with fixed exchange rates in countries such as Venezuela, Para- 
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guay, and Guatemala. Many countries rapidly adapted to their new circum- 
stances. The exchange rate ceased to be a sacrosanct variable linked to the 
nationalistic destinies of countries; during the late 1980s, a large number of 
economies had become increasingly comfortable with managed exchange rate 
regimes. 
Recently, however, a number of observers and experts-including  promi- 
nent members of the IMF Executive Board-have  argued that the enthusiasm 
for devaluation and an active exchange rate policy has gone too far. It has been 
pointed out that, by relying too heavily on exchange rate adjustments, and by 
allowing developing countries to adopt administered systems characterized by 
frequent small devaluations, Fund programs have become excessively infla- 
tionary. According to this view, exchange rate policy in the developing coun- 
tries should move toward greater rigidity-and  even complete fixity-as  a 
way to induce financial discipline and reduce inflation. This position, which 
is steadily gaining new  supporters, has largely been  influenced by  current 
macroeconomic views that emphasize the role of expectations, credibility, and 
institutional constraints (see, e.g., Aghevli, Khan, and Montiel 1991; Agenor 
and Montiel, 1991; and Burton and Gilman, 1991). 
It would be illusory, however, to think that a return to greater exchange rate 
fixity will completely eliminate situations of “fundamental disequilibrium.” In 
fact, most supporters of nominal exchange rate anchors concede that, under 
conditions of severe exchange rate misalignment, it is generally advisable to 
implement adjustment packages that combine fiscal and credit restraint with a 
discrete nominal devaluation (see Burton and Gilman 1991). What is perhaps 
paradoxical is that precisely this type of pegged arrangement, where the cur- 
rency may be occasionally devalued by a large amount, was extremely contro- 
versial during the Bretton Woods period. In fact, the “devaluation issue” was 
often at the forefront of conflict between national authorities and the staff of 
the International Monetary Fund. Even under conditions of obvious “funda- 
mental disequilibrium,” the economic authorities in the developing countries 
tended to resist devaluing their currencies. Instead, they often imposed trade 
and exchange controls in an effort to avoid a balance of payments crisis.’ This 
historical resistance to devaluations had its roots in a deep skepticism about 
the effectiveness of exchange rate adjustment. In fact, it has been common- 
place in the developing world to argue that large and discrete devaluations- 
and  especially devaluations implemented within  the  context of  IMF  pro- 
grams-have  no effect on the external sector, result in output contractions, 
and worsen income distribution. (see Denoon 1986; Buira  1983; and SELA 
1986). 
An  important question in the current debate regarding the desirability of a 
1. There has traditionally been a sense among some observers that LDCs have been forced by 
third parties-and  in particular  by  the IMF-to  devalue their currencies  (see, e.g.,  Denoon 
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return to fixed rates revolves around the actual effectiveness of  discrete and 
substantial devaluations in the context of a fixed rate regime. The purpose of 
this paper is to deal with this issue from a historical perspective. We  analyze 
the conditions surrounding 48 major devaluation episodes in the developing 
countries that took place during the Bretton Woods period (1954-71).  By fo- 
cusing on the Bretton Woods era, we can examine the fundamental empirical 
features of large nominal devaluations in a historical environment with gen- 
eralized fixed exchange rates. 
This paper differs from previous work in three fundamental respects. First, 
a formal distinction is made between devaluations undertaken within the con- 
text of an IMF program and unilateral devaluations implemented without a 
formal IMF-sponsored program.2 This distinction is particularly interesting 
because it allows a critical assessment of the role of the Fund; it provides a 
very natural benchmark for evaluating the results associated with IMF pro- 
grams. In that sense, the traditional difficulty of finding appropriate “counter- 
factuals” to IMF programs is somewhat red~ced.~  In this analysis, we ask why 
some countries sought IMF supports while others undertook adjustment-cum- 
devaluation programs on their own. We also inquire whether, on average, IMF 
devaluers tended to fare better than non-IMF devaluers. Second, in addition 
to analyzing the economic aspects of these devaluations, we investigate some 
important political developments surrounding these episodes. We  inquire, in 
particular, whether countries that received IMF assistance were characterized 
by a different political environment than those that did not approach the Fund. 
We  also analyze the extent to which the political structure affects the degree 
of success of an adjustment-cum-devaluation  program. Third, we compare the 
main features of  these Bretton Woods devaluations with a number of  more 
recent devaluations. 
The empirical approach followed here is based on Edwards (1988, 1989c) 
and combines nonparametric tests with cross-country regression analyses in 
an effort to understand the circumstances surrounding these forty-eight deval- 
uations. A salient feature of  our approach is that we  analyze in detail the 
evolution of a number of key variables during the three years preceding and 
three years following the forty-eight devaluation episodes. In doing this, an 
effort is made to detect regularities across countries that will allow us to infer 
some general rules relating to the causes and effects of devaluations. At the 
same time, we point out peculiarities that help better understand the exchange 
rate history of a particular country. In addition to the groups of IMF and non- 
IMF devaluation countries, we defined a control group of twenty-four devel- 
2. For  lack of  a better name, we call these  unilateral devaluations. Notice,  however, that, 
according to Bretton Woods rules, the Fund had to approve all nominal devaluations exceeding 
10%. 
3. Most studies evaluating the effectiveness of Fund programs have compared these programs 
with countries that have not undertaken an adjustment program. This has even been the case with 
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oping nations that maintained a fixed nominal exchange rate for at least ten 
years; their behavior is compared to that of the devaluing countries. In these 
comparisons, a series of parametric and nonparametric tests were 
8.1  The Simple Economics of Devaluation, 
Adjustment, and Credibility 
In this section, we briefly provide an analytic framework for the empirical 
analysis that follows. We  first analyze the conditions leading to a situation of 
“fundamental disequilibrium” and external sector crisis and discuss the con- 
ditions under which devaluations are effecti~e.~  We then analyze the role of an 
external multilateral agency, such as the IMF, in a stabilization program. 
8.1.1  Fundamental Disequilibrium and the Theory of Devaluations 
Fixed exchange rates introduce restrictions to macroeconomic policies: if a 
(small) country wants to maintain its parity, its inflation rate cannot exceed 
(for a significant period of time) the rate of world inflation. Historically, how- 
ever, policymakers have tried to ignore the constraints imposed by  fixed ex- 
change rates by implementing rapid fiscal expansions. If, as is often the case, 
this increase in fiscal expenditures is mostly financed through domestic credit 
creation, we will have a number of macroeconomic effects. First, there will 
be an increase in the demand for tradable goods, a worsening of the current 
account, and, with other things given, a loss of international reserves. Sec- 
ond, there will be a higher demand for home goods, a higher domestic rate of 
inflation, a real exchange rate (RER)  overvaluation, and a continuous erosion 
in the country’s degree of international competitiveness. 
As international reserves draw lower, the government will usually try to 
tackle the situation by  imposing exchange, capital, and trade controls. The 
parallel premium for foreign exchange will increase, and the black market will 
grow in  scope. Naturally, these controls will not solve the crisis; they will 
merely slow down the loss of reserves and postpone the required adjustment. 
At some point the authorities will realize-or  will be forced to recognize- 
that the country is  following an unsustainable path  and that adjustment is 
required. This stylized story suggests that the conditions faced by  countries 
facing “fundamental disequilibrium,” and thus the need to devalue, can be 
summarized as follows: (1) fiscal and credit policies become “inconsistent” 
4.  This episodic strategy has modem precedents in Cooper’s (1971a,  1971b, 1971c) classic 
studies of  devaluation and, more recently, in Harberger and Edwards’s (1982) study of  balance of 
payments crises. However, Cooper did not deal with the period preceding the devaluation, and, 
contrary to this study and to Harberger and Edwards’s, he did not use a control group for compar- 
ison. Other studies that make use of  the episodic approach employed in this paper are Kamin 
(1988) and Eichengreen (1990). 
5. For a more technical representation of  the economics of  devaluation, see, e.g., Edwards 
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with the objective of  maintaining a fixed exchange rate; (2) there is a rapid 
rate of domestic inflation; (3) there is a large current account deficit; (4) inter- 
national reserves become very low  and continue to decline; (5) the parallel 
market premium increases; and (6) the RER becomes rapidly overvalued. Of 
course, a situation of “fundamental disequilibrium” can also be caused by  a 
real shock (like a change in the terms of trade) that creates a macroeconomic 
gap that has to be closed. 
The first fundamental step in an adjustment program is to tackle the sources 
of the initial disequilibrium: the fiscal imbalance has to be reduced and finan- 
cial discipline reestablished. Another crucial element in the adjustment pro- 
gram is the correction of  the situation of  RER  overvaluation. The relative 
price of tradables to nontradables faced by domestic agents has to increase to 
a level compatible with external equilibrium. There are two basic ways of 
achieving this required RER adjustment or RER devaluation. The first is to 
follow a disinjutionury  policy, where the reduction in aggregate demand at- 
rained through the fiscal adjustment forces a reduction in nominal prices of 
nontradable goods.  This  option,  however,  has  two  important drawbacks: 
under most circumstances it is too slow, and, if nominal prices (or wages) are 
inflexible downward, the transition will be characterized by unemployment 
and reduced production. The second basic alternative for reestablishing RER 
equilibrium is by  engineering an increase in the domestic price of  tradable 
goods through a nominal devaluation. In this case, of course, all the nominal 
devaluation is attempting to do is speed-up the adjustment. Even when re- 
alignment of relative prices is accomplished, the nominal devaluation is not 
the ultimate cause of the observed real exchange rate change; it is merely the 
vehicle through which the adjustment is attained.6 
Naturally, for the nominal devaluation to be effective, in the sense of truly 
helping reestablish macroeconomic equilibrium in a smoother fashion, two 
main conditions have to be met. First, the devaluation has to be taken from a 
starting disequilibrium situation of  RER overvaluation; second, the devalua- 
tion has to be accompanied by consistent macroeconomic and, especially, fis- 
cal policies.’ If these conditions are not met, the devaluation will not be suc- 
cessful.8 In sections 8.2 and 8.3 below, we  use data on forty-eight discrete 
6. Eichengreen (1990) documents how, during the 1930s. some countries decided to follow a 
7. These may include the need to deindex labor and other contracts. 
8. The above discussion clearly suggests that, in order for devaluations to “work,” there is no 
need, as is often suggested, for economic  agents to have  money illusion.  Indeed,  within this 
scenario, devaluations will facilitate the adjustment even when there are ultra-rational forward- 
looking economic agents. In fact, in a fonvard-looking world, devaluations undertaken within the 
context described here will tend to be particularly effective. The reason for this is that these highly 
informed rational individuals will clearly understand that the devaluation is facilitating relative 
price changes and, thus, is inducing the required expenditure switching away from tradable goods. 
Consequently, economic agents will not react to this exchange rate change in a perverse way. 
However, if  the devaluation is not accompanied by  consistent macroeconomic policies,  the in- 
deflation while others chose to devalue their currency. 410  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
devaluation episodes to analyze whether the experience in the LDCs during 
the Bretton Woods period conforms to the view  on devaluation cases pre- 
sented here. 
8.1.2  Credibility, Commitment, and Adjustment 
Recent work on stabilization and adjustment has emphasized the role of 
institutions and credibility. A number of authors have argued that, in order to 
put an end to macroeconomic and external sector disequilibrium, a “credible” 
change of  the policy regime is needed (Sargent 1986; see also Edwards and 
Tabellini 1991a, 1991b). To the extent that a stabilization is not credible- 
that is, to the extent that the public does not expect that the program will 
achieve its intended results-the  cost of adjustment escalates, and the proba- 
bility of success becomes smaller (Dornbusch 1991). 
This view leads governments naturally to look for ways of modifying and 
influencing expectations during a stabilization program. “Policy announce- 
ments” have been considered a possible vehicle for affecting inflationary ex- 
pectations. However, it has been argued that in order for these announcements 
to be “credible”-and,  thus, actually to affect expectations-it  is necessary 
for the government to be able to precommit itself to a given course of action. 
This, of course, turns out to be difficult since societies many times lack the 
institutional setup required for the government to precommit itself credibly. 
Under certain circumstances, however, reputation can act as a substitute for 
precommitment. According to this view,  the desire of a government to pre- 
serve its reputation-or,  even possibly, improve it-provides  it with a con- 
strained set of policy options (see Persson and Tabellini 1990). Some authors 
have recently  suggested that expectations can also be coordinated and that 
credibility can be established if it is supported by an external institution, such 
as the League of  Nations in the 1920s and the International Monetary Fund 
after 1950 (see Sachs 1989; Edwards 1989b; and Santaella 1991). The reason 
is that, by granting its “seal of approval” to a stabilization plan, the external 
institution enhances the confidence in the program. In principle, this “seal of 
approval” will be independent of the financing that the external institution can 
pr~vide.~  In fact, the presence of external involvement can endow the stabiliz- 
ing government with a “commitment technology” that gives a greater assur- 
ance that the announced program will indeed be fully carried out. This frame- 
work has two important empirical implications: first, we  would expect that 
countries that have more difficulty establishing independent credibility would 
formed public will anticipate a devaluation-inflation spiral, making the situation even more critical 
than before. Some cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of devaluations can be found in 
Cooper (1971a,  1971b,  1971c), Edwards (1989~).  Kamin (1988), and Gylfason and Radetzki 
(1985). 
9. Accounts of  the support given by external credits and loans to stabilizing countries are in 
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be more likely to approach the IMF; second, to the extent that IMF-sponsored 
programs provide additional credibility, it would be expected that, with other 
things given, countries that undertake an IMF stabilization-cum-devaluation 
adjustment program would have an advantage over those nations that unilat- 
erally implement adjustment programs. These empirical propositions are con- 
fronted with data from our forty-eight devaluation episodes in the sections that 
follow. 
8.2  Macroeconomic Policy, Fundamental Disequilibrium, 
and IMF Programs 
In this and the following section, we analyze in detail forty-eight episodes 
of balance of payments and devaluation crises in the LDCs between 1954 and 
1971. This investigation focuses on five important issues; (a) the role of “in- 
consistent” macroeconomic policies in generating “fundamental disequilib- 
ria” and in precipitating devaluation crises; (b) the differences, if any, between 
IMF and non-IMF devaluations; (c) the effectiveness of nominal devaluations 
as a means of restoring equilibrium and competitiveness; (d) the role of polit- 
ical forces in devaluation and IMF involvement; and (e) the determinants of 
successful stabilization-cum-devaluation  packages. 
8.2.1  The Data Set 
Our data set consists of  forty-eight major stepwise devaluations imple- 
mented by  independent developing countries in the period 1948-7 1. In order 
for a devaluation episode to be included in our sample, it had to have the 
following properties: (1) the adjustment of the official rate had to exceed 14%; 
(2) the devaluation must have occurred after a period of  at least two years 
where the country had a fixed exchange rate; and (3) the country in question 
must have had a population of at least one million people the year of the de- 
valuation. Using the Znternational Financial Statistics  (ZFS) tape and other 
sources, we  identified sixty-nine devaluation episodes that met the three re- 
quirements set up above. Once those cases with no (or very little) data on the 
most important variables were eliminated, we were left with the forty-eight 
countries considered here. In that sense, then, an effort was made to identify, 
and then include, every one of the large step wise devaluation episodes that 
took place in the developing world during 1954-7 1. The final inclusion crite- 
ria were based exclusively on data availability. 
The exact dates of our forty-eight devaluations, as well as the inception and 
expiration dates of  IMF standby programs, are shown in table 8.1. Twenty- 
two of the forty-eight devaluers implemented a unilateral (i.e., non-IMF) de- 
valuation, while twenty-six had IMF programs. All the IMF programs consid- 
ered here were standby arrangements, which were envisaged in 1952 by the 
Fund to control drawings in the credit trenches. Standby programs soon be- 
came the main instrument through which the IMF imposed conditionality. The 412  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8.1  Devaluation Episodes and IMF Programs in Selected 



















































28 Oct. 1955 
2 Jan. 1959 
19 Mar. 1962 
18 June 1970 
13 Feb. 1967 




22 Mar.  1967 
2 Sept. 1961 
14 July 1961 
17 Aug. 1970 
7 May 1962 
8 July 1967 
27 Dec. 1971 
6 June 1966 
17 Apr. 1970 
9Feb. 1962 
19Nov. 1967 
21 Aug. 1971 
21 Nov.  1967 
23 Feb. 1960 
3 May  1964 
20Nov. 1967 
19 Apr.  1954 
1 July 1955 
1 Aug. 1955 
22 Jan. 1958 
31 Aug. 1967 
22 Jan. 1962 
21 Feb. 1970 
22 Nov. 1967 
18 July 1959 
20 Nov.  1967 
22 Nov. 1967 
23 Nov.  1967 
28 Sept. 1964 
4Aug. 1958 
3 Aug. 1970 
15 Dec.  1959 
9 May  1963 
26 Apr.  1971 
18 Jan. 1964 
1 Jan. 1961 
25 July 1965 
19 Dec. 1958 
12Dec. 1961 
13 Feb. 1967 
19June 1957 
1 Jan. 1962 
... 
15 Apr. 1967 
4Oct. 1961 
8 June 1961 
14 Sept. 1970 
7 May  1962 
25 May 1967 
... 
... 




16 Apr.  1954 
... 
18 Feb. 1957 
18 Aug.  1967 
12 Apr.  1962 
20Feb. 1970 




1 Oct. 1964 
17Aug. 1970 
4 Oct. 1962 
28 May  1970 
1 Jan. 1961 





18 Dec. 1959a 
1  1 Dec. 1962b 
12 Feb. 1968 
18 June 1958 
31 Dec. 1962 
... 
14Apr. 1968 
3 Oct. 1962 
7 June 1962 
13 Sept. 1971 
6 May  1963 





15 Apr. 1955 
17 Feb. 1958' 
17 Aug. 1968 
11 Apr. 1963 
19 Feb. 1971 
16 Aug. 1960 
... 
30 Sept. 1965 
16 Aug.  1971 
3 Oct. 1963 
27 May  1971 
... 
31 Dec. 1961 
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Table 8.1  (continued) 
IMF Program 
Country  Devaluation Date  Inception Date  Expiration Date 
47. Yugoslavia  23 Jan. 1971  22 Feb. 1971  21 Feb. 1972 
48. Zaire  24 June 1967  6 July  1967  July 5, 1968 
Sources: Pick’s Currency Yearbook and IMF Annual Reports and Reports on Exchange Resrric- 
rions. 
Gmceled on 2 December 1959, when a new standby arrangement commenced. 
bCanceled  on 16 May  1962. 
‘Canceled on 9 February  1958, when a new standby arrangement commenced. 
dCanceled on 29 July  1971, when a new standby arrangement commenced. 
specific contents of these programs, however, were not homogeneous across 
our sample of twenty-six IMF programs; the concept of phasing (i.e., draw- 
ings in installments) was not introduced until 1956, and we had to wait until 
1958 to observe whether drawings were made conditional on performance 
criteria.I0 
Table 8.2  contains the percentage change in the (official) exchange rate the 
year of the crisis and in the three subsequent years. As pointed out, all the 
countries in our sample devalued their currencies by at least 14% after having 
maintained a fixed (official) exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar (or a 
stable managed float, like in the cases of  Peru in  1958, Argentina in  1962, 
and Brazil in 1967) for two or more years. The non-IMF episodes are shown 
in panel A; the average depreciation of the exchange rate was 61%, while the 
median was 39%. The IMF programs are shown in panel B; on average, they 
devalued by 52% (43% was the median). As can be seen, while most of these 
countries returned to a fixed (or almost fixed) exchange rate, a few decided to 
follow a crawling peg system after the crisis. Also, through the years, some 
of the countries in our sample suffered recurrent crises and devaluations.” The 
nature of these devaluations and the specific circumstances that surrounded 
the episodes were very diverse. Some of the devaluations occurred in a unified 
exchange system and consisted in de jure modifications of the par value or the 
gold content of the currency agreed with the IMF. More frequently, however, 
there were de facto devaluations in which the parity of the official exchange 
rate was maintained but the depreciation was effected by the introduction of a 
regime based  on multiple exchange rates.  In  other episodes, devaluations 
were implemented through the unification of multiple nominal exchange rates 
10. For discussions of the evolution of IMF policies, see Dell (1981), Guitiin (1981).  de Vries 
(1976, 1987), and Horsefield (1969). 
11. From today’s perspective, it is paradoxical to see Spain among the developing countries. 
However, during the Bretton Woods period, Spain’s per capita income was similar to that of many 
developing nations. 414  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8.2  Devaluation Crises and the IMF in the Bretton Woods Period 
Rate of Devaluation (exchange rate in local currency 
units per  dollar) 
Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yr.  3 Yr. 
Country  Year  Year  After  After  After 
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-1.2  8.1 
.o  .o 
7.2  29.4 
16.7  7.1 
-  10.2  .o 
1.1  -  .9 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  42.9 
-  .7  .3 
.o  .o 
-  .2  1.3 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
-  .6  .I 
-  .7  .3 
.3  -  .5 
.5  .o 
-  .7  .3 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.4  61.5 
13.9  24.9 
26.6  2.1 
.o  4.7 
.o  50.0 
5.7  6.9 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
-  3.6  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
5.4  -  .8 
-  .2  -  .o 
.o  .o 
.o  .o 
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Table 8.2  (continued) 
Rate of Devaluation (exchange rate in local currency 
units per dollar) 
~~~ 
Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yr.  3 Yr. 
Country  Year  Year  After  After  After 
Uruguay  1971  48.0  97.8  28.0  76.6 
Yugoslavia  1961  18.7  .o  .o  .o 
Yugoslavia  1965  66.7  .o  .o  .o 
Yugoslavia  1971  36.0  .o  -8.2  9.3 
Zaire  1967  203.0  .o  .o  .o 
Source: International Financial Statistics and Pick‘s Currency Yearbook. 
or through the (temporary) withdrawal of the central bank’s intervention in the 
exchange market, allowing the exchange rate to float momentarily to a higher 
parity at which a new peg was to be maintained. In the appendix, we present 
a brief description of each of the forty-eight devaluation episodes, and section 
8.2.3 discusses in detail the experience with parallel and multiple exchange 
rate practices. 
8.2.2 
Under  fixed nominal exchange rates,  macroeconomic policies determine 
whether the exchange rate chosen by  the authorities can be sustained in the 
longer run. Under most circumstances,  if  macroeconomic policies become 
“inconsistent,” international reserves will be eroded, the real exchange rate 
will experience an appreciation (i.e., overvaluation), and an exchange rate 
crisis-that  is, a devaluation-will  eventually occur. From an empirical point 
of  view, it is not trivial to determine whether, for a particular country at a 
particular moment in time, macroeconomic policies have indeed become in- 
consistent with the fixed peg. In this section, we tackle this issue by compar- 
ing the evolution of  macroeconomic policy  in the devaluing countries with 
that of a control group of twenty-four fixed rate countries.’* 
Table 8.3  summarizes the behavior of five indicators of domestic credit and 
fiscal policies for our two groups of devaluing countries (IMF and non-IMF 
countries) and for the control group: (1) the rate of growth of domestic credit 
(panel A); (2) the rate of growth of  domestic credit to the public sector (panel 
Macroeconomic Policies and Fundamental Disequilibria 
12. This approach, of course, assumes that the control group followed sustainable policies. The 
countries, and years in the control group are the CBte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Mex- 
ico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore, Sudan, Thailand, Thnisia, Venezuela, and 
Zambia. For more details, and for some of the most important caveats in using the control group 
approach, see Edwards (1989~).  In this paper, years included as observations in the control group 
have been restricted to the Bretton Woods period. 416  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8.3  Indicators of Macroeconomic  Policy in Forty-eight Devaluation Episodes 
and a Control Group of Fixers 
~~  ~  ~ 
Year of 
3 Yrs. Prior  2 Yrs. Prior  1 Yr. Prior  Devaluation 
Non-  Non-  Non-  Non-  Control 
IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  Group 
A. Annual growth of  domestic credit (%) 
lstquartile  12.4  9.1  10.4  12.6  11.0  15.6  6.9 
Median  23.5  16.7  16.1  19.6  17.8  18.7  15.4 
3dquartile  35.8  28.6  23.9  29.5  24.9  28.5  22.7 
B.  Annual growth of domestic credit to the public sector (%) 
lstquartile  9.4  < 0  <O  5.9  < 0  8.8  <  0 
Median  27.6  5.8  12.6  28.2  11.5  14.3  .o 
3dquartile  72.3  43.1  32.2  60.5  38.6  58.3  23.1 
C.  Ratio of domestic credit to public sector to total domestic credit 
lstquartile  13.5  11.0  12.8  14.0  14.4  14.2  8.4 
Median  24.9  22.2  25.1  23.6  27.2  21.8  26.0 
3dquartile  50.3  35.6  42.3  31.2  42.7  33.4  39.4 
D. Fiscal dejicit as  percentage of  GDP 
Median  2.6  1.3  2.9  1.1  2.6  1.9  2.1 
3dquartile  5.6  2.6  4.8  2.5  4.4  3.2  4.8 
E.  Growth of domestic credit to the public sector as  percentage of GDP (%). 
1st quartile  .I  -.2  -  .2  .1  -.o  .4  -.8 
Median  1.8  .5  1  .o  1.2  .9  .9  .5 
3dquartile  2.9  2.7  1.7  2.7  2.0  2.4  2.3 
1st quartile  1.5  .1  .9  .5  .7  1.0  1.0 
12.3  8.6 
17.1  14.7 
21.5  22.5 
13.1  -7.7 
29.1  12.0 
58.3  42.2 
12.8  1.2 
24.8  16.3 
34.5  29.4 
.5  .4 
2.5  1.2 
4.3  2.5 
.7  -.2 
1  .5  .5 
2.9  1.6 
Source: Constructed by the authors from raw data obtained from International Financial Statistics 
B); (3) the percentage of credit received by the public sector as a proportion 
of total domestic credit (panel C); (4)  the fiscal deficit as a proportion of  GDP 
(panel D); and (5) the increase in domestic credit to the public sector as a 
percentage of GDP. All the indicators have been constructed using data from 
various issues of International Financial Statistics, several IFS tapes, as well 
as the United Nations Statistical Yearbook. For the two devaluation groups, 
these indicators are reported for three years, two years, and one year prior to 
the devaluation and for the year of the devaluation. While panels A and B deal 
with monetary (or domestic credit) policy, the rest of  the panels take us be- 
yond the monetary realm and into the fiscal side of the economy. 
A number of interesting facts emerge from this table. First, macroeconomic 
policies became increasingly expansive in the devaluing countries as the year 
of the devaluation drew nearer. Indeed, when the data for three years prior to 
the crisis are compared to those from the year of the devaluation, a clear shift 
to the right in most of the distributions can be detected. Second, IMF and non- 
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one year prior to the devaluation the countries that ended up requiring IMF 
support were generally implementing more expansive policies than non-IMF 
devaluers. Moreover, computation of nonparametric x2  tests strongly suggests 
a different behavior across IMF and non-IMF devaluers. Finally, the devaluing 
countries as a group behaved quite differently than the control group. This is 
particularly clear for the fiscal policy indicators. For example, in the year of 
the crisis, half the devaluing countries allocated one-quarter or more of total 
domestic credit to the public sector; the median for the control group coun- 
tries, on the other hand, was only slightly higher than 16%. Formal x2  tests 
indicate that, with a fairly high degree of probability, these policy indicators 
for the devaluing nations come from a different population than those for the 
control group. 
Table 8.4  contains the x2  statistics that test the hypothesis that our fiscal 
policy indicators for devaluers and control group countries come from the 
same population. These x2  statistics show a very clear picture. First,  they 
show that, for three of the indicators, the null hypothesis that devaluers and 
the control group belonged to the same population is rejected at fairly high 
levels of significance. Additionally, these x2  tests suggest quite clearly that, as 
the crisis date approached, macro policies in both devaluing groups tended to 
become more and more inconsistent with the goal of  maintaining a fixed ex- 
change rate (i.e., they became significantly more different than the control 
Even though, when taken as a group, the devaluing countries behaved in a 
distinctively different way than the control group, the policies of  some indi- 
vidual stepwise devaluers-Venezuela,  for example-were  fairly similar to 
those of the control group. Also, the countries that devalued their currencies 
following the British pound realignment of  1967 (Israel, Jamaica, Malawi, 
Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad) provide interesting individual 
cases. The macroeconomic policy indicators in all these countries show that 
their policies were very expansive in the years immediately preceding 1967, 
relative both to the control group and to the United Kingdom. In fact, statisti- 
cally speaking, none of these countries behaved differently than the rest of the 
devaluing groups. This suggests, then, that, even in the absence of the pound 
devaluation, many of these countries may have had to realign their parities. 
As pointed out in section 8.1, expansive macroeconomic policies will have 
an effect on the current account, the level of foreign assets, inflation, and the 
real exchange rate. Table 8.5 contains data for the forty-eight episodes on the 
evolution of (1) the index of the (bilateral) real exchange rate with respect to 
the U.S. dollar;I3  (2) the ratio of net foreign assets of the monetary system to 
group). 
13. Since during the Bretton Woods  period there was relative exchange rate stability, focusing 
on bilateral rather than multilateral RERs does not bias the analysis. In  fact, for most of these 
countries, bilateral and multilateral real exchange rates behaved very  similarly throughout the 
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Table 8.4  x1  Tests Comparing Fiscal Behavior in Devaluation Countries and 
the Control Group' 
3 Yrs. before  Year of 
Devaluation  Devaluation 
A. Ratio of  domestic credit to public sector to total domestic credit 
IMF devaluers  8.4  8.4 
(.015)  (.015) 
Non-IMF devaluers  2.6  4.1 
(.268)  (.127) 
B. Fiscal deficit as percentage of  GDP 
IMF devaluers  .2  6.3 
Non-IMF devaluers  8.2  6.0 
(.  898)  (.042) 
(.016)  (.049) 
C.  Growth of  domestic credit to the public sector as 
IMF devaluers  2.4  8.6 
Non-IMF devaluers  13.5  4.7 
percentage of  GDP 
(.307)  (.013) 
(.001)  (.094) 
"his  test is distributed ~~(2).  Figures in parentheses are levels of  probabilities. 
the domestic stock of money; and (3) the current account as a percentage of 
GDP for three years and one year preceding the crisis. The main difference 
between table 8.3 and table 8.5 is that the former summarizes the behavior of 
five key exogenous policy variables while the latter deals with endogenous 
variables  whose  behavior  responds  to  macroeconomic policy  and  other 
shocks. 
The data in table 8.5 clearly capture the deterioration of the external sector 
in  the period immediately preceding the devaluations. In thirty-nine of  the 
forty-seven episodes with relevant data, the real exchange rate experienced 
a real appreciation in the three years prior to the devaluation. For the IMF 
devaluers, the average real appreciation was  12.0%, while, for the non-IMF 
devaluers, it was 9.4%. Naturally, this real appreciation was the result of do- 
mestic rates of inflation that increasingly exceeded the world rate of inflation. 
A x2  test indicates that, as the crisis date came closer, the rate of CPI inflation 
in  both groups of  devaluing countries became more distinct, in  a statistical 
sense, from that of the fixed rate control group. As is apparent from table 8.5, 
there is quite a difference in the individual countries' experiences. While some 
countries (such as Colombia in  1965, Argentina in  1959 and 1962, Brazil in 
1967, and Indonesia in  1970) went through a major deterioration in competi- 
tiveness, others (i.e., Venezuela in 1964, Trinidad in 1967, and Yugoslavia in 
1961) experienced only an insignificant change in the real exchange rate in- 
dex. It should be noticed, however, that there is a strong presumption that the 419  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.5  Real Exchange Rates, Current Account, and Net Foreign Assets in Period 
Leading to Forty-eight Devaluations 
Net Foreign 
Real Exchange  Current Account  Asset as C 
Rate'  as % of GDP  of Money Supply 
3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr. 
Year  prior  Prior  Prior  Prior  Prior  Prior 
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110.2  100.0 
117.2  100.0 
120.5  100.0 
155.7  100.0 
101.2  100.0 
121.2  100.0 
109.1  100.0 
107.0  100.0 
102.5  100.0 
99.7  100.0 
97.8  100.0 
127.7  100.0 
97.6  100.0 
122.9  100.0 
102.6  100.0 
103.2  100.0 
113.8  100.0 
95.2  100.0 
100.7  100.0 
128.3  100.0 
129.8  100.0 
100.5  100.0 
-9.4 
147.5  100.0 
145.3  100.0 
185.6  100.0 
102.2  100.0 
108.1  100.0 
78.7b  100.0 
101.3  100.0 
101.2  100.0 
104.3  100.0 
101.3  100.0 
134.6  100.0 
178.9  100.0 
117.2  100.0 
106.4  100.0 
119.5  100.0 
105.7  100.0 
97.9  100.0 
-3.6 
.7 
-  2.5 
-2.3 
-  1.4 
-2.5 
-  18.0 
-23.6 
-  19.6 
-  10.1 
-  9.8 
-8.6 
-  12.0 
-  2.5 
-3.1 
-5.7 








-  .o 
-  .2 
1.6 
-  3.0 
-  3.2 








-  .7 
-  2.9 
.o 




-  2.9 
-  17.9 
-  14.6 
-25.9 
-  14.7 
-6.9 
-  10.4 






-  .8 
1.1 
9.1 





-  .8 





-  1.2 
-  6.0 
-7.2 
-  1.7 






1  .o 
-  10.7 
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Table 8.5  (continued) 
Net Foreign 
Real Exchange  Current Account  Asset as % 
Rate“  as 8  of  GDP  of  Money Supply 
3Yrs.  1Yr.  3Yrs.  I  Yr.  3Yrs.  1Yr. 





























100.0  -2.3 
100.0  -10.1 
100.0  -.6 
100.0  -6.0 
100.0  1.4 
100.0  -2.6 
100.0  -1.8 
100.0  -2.4 
100.0  -  1.9 
-  12.w 
-1.7  1.8  .8 
-  10.5  22.9  3.4 
-1.3  5.0  5.9 
-3.6  -2.1  -40.8 
-2.3  -20.0  -10.0 
-2.1  .o  .o 
-3.1  2.3  -  .9 
-6.1  -.7  -2.8 
-  2.6  15.5  10.0 
-  1.3  -  3.4 
Source: Constructed from raw data obtained from International Financial Statistics. 
‘A decline in the index depicts real appreciation. 
bColombia  devalued in 1965. This explains the evolution of the RER before the 1967 devaluation. 
cExcludes  Colombia in  1967. 
recorded average real rates of appreciation presented in table 8.5 provide an 
underestimation of the “true” magnitude of disequilibrium. This is because, 
in many cases in the period leading to the crisis, price controls became quite 
pervasive  (like  in  centrally  planned  Yugoslavia),  rendering  official CPIs 
somewhat inadequate to construct RER indices.  l4 
The evolution of net foreign assets and of the current account balance, also 
presented in table 8.5, clearly captures the effect of  the inconsistent macro 
policies on the external accounts. In fifteen of the twenty-two non-IMF epi- 
sodes, and in twenty-one of the twenty-six IMF cases, the ratio of net foreign 
assets to money experienced a decline during this two-year period. On aver- 
age, for the non-IMF countries, the net foreign assets ratio declined 5.0 per- 
centage points during the two years prior to the devaluation; the corresponding 
drop for the IMF devaluers was  smaller (3.5 points) but reached a very low 
average ratio the year before the crisis (1.5%). That year the median of this 
indicator for both groups of devaluers was 5.1  %, significantly below the me- 
dian for the control group of more than 20%. Also, in twelve of the twenty- 
two non-IMF episodes, and in twenty of  the twenty-six IMF devaluers, the 
current account balance worsened in the two years before the crisis, with the 
magnitude of deterioration reaching almost 1 percentage point of GDP in both 
groups. The year prior to the crisis, the median of the current account deficit 
14. This is partially reflected in the data on the parallel market premium presented in table 8.6 
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was 3.8%  of GDP for the IMF group and 6.6%  for non-IMF episodes, both 
higher than the 3.6%  deficit for the control group. 
In addition to the worsening of the current account, capital flight is a crucial 
force underlying the weakening position of  these countries’ external sector. 
Data not reported here show that, in spite of  existing and increasing control 
on capital mobility, as the devaluation drew nearer, and as a result of  the 
heightened expectations of devaluation, substantially larger amounts of funds 
flew from these countries.LS 
The data in table 8.5 clearly highlight the important fact that, although it is 
possible to identify a dominant pattern among these devaluation episodes, 
there are nontrivial differences across countries. In the majority of cases, the 
devaluation responded to the simultaneous depletion of  international reserves 
and loss in competitiveness (i.e., real exchange appreciation). In a few epi- 
sodes, however, it is not possible to detect either of  these symptoms in the 
years prior to the crisis. In the case of the 1964 Venezuelan devaluation, for 
instance, the exchange rate adjustment amounted to a trade liberalization pro- 
gram in which the unification of  nominal exchange rates was  an important 
component. In Indonesia, a similar currency simplification took place with 
the 1970 devaluation.16 
The lack of data on external terms of trade did not allow us to analyze for 
every country whether devaluations responded, at least partially, to an exoge- 
nously driven deterioration of  the external sector. However, in some of  the 
episodes for which we could gather data, the devaluation was preceded by  a 
worsening in the terms of trade. Although this does not mean that the terms 
of  trade  deterioration was  the  ultimate cause of  the devaluation crisis,  it 
clearly indicates that external shocks can play a nontrivial role in unleashing 
external crises. 
The data in table 8.5 show an important difference between IMF-devaluers 
and non-IMF countries. On average, those countries that requested IMF as- 
sistance had experienced a more dramatic loss in international competitive- 
ness (measured by the extent of  RER appreciation in the three-year period 
preceding the devaluation) and a more precarious situation in their net foreign 
asset position than those countries that devalued unilaterally. Also, IMF de- 
valuers experienced a more serious worsening of  the current account deficit 
than non-IMF devaluers: 1.3 percentage points of GDP versus 0.3 points for 
non-IMF countries. However, the average level of the current account deficit 
the year prior to the exchange rate adjustment was significantly higher in the 
unilateral adjusters than in the IMF devaluers. The main explanation for this 
is that, as shown in table 8.5, IMF devaluers initially had a lower availability 
of  foreign assets than non-IMF countries and, thus, could not sustain deep 
current account deficits. 
15. For data on capital flight for some of the countries in our sample as well as for a number of 
16. For more details of these and other cases, see the appendix. 
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8.2.3  Parallel Markets, Multiple Exchange Rate Practices, 
and Devaluation Crises 
In table 8.6, we present data on multiple (official) exchange rates and on 
parallel (black) market premia in the period immediately preceding the deval- 
uations. As can be seen, in many of these episodes, the period preceding the 
devaluation was characterized by the existence of multiple exchange rates. It 
is interesting to note, however, that, in most instances, the multiple rates were 
in place at least three years before the crisis and that, in most countries, there 
was no increase in the number of  official rates as the devaluation date ap- 
proached. 
The data in table 8.6 show that, in thirty-four of the forty-five devaluation 
episodes with available data, there was a significant increase in the parallel 
premium during the period preceding the crisis. The median premium among 
IMF devaluers increased from  12.0% three years before the devaluation to 
48.1% one month before, while it went from 37.5% to 63.1% for the non- 
IMF countries in the same period. This evolution of  the parallel market pre- 
mium reflects three interrelated forces. First, in the presence of  a freely de- 
termined parallel rate,  expansive domestic credit policies will  usually  be 
reflected in a depreciation of the free rate at the same time as the domestic rate 
of inflation increases and international reserves are eroded. Second, this hike 
in the premium is capturing the public’s reaction to the movement toward 
greater exchange controls. In fact, the analysis of  the evolution of  foreign 
trade restrictions clearly shows that, in the vast majority of countries, regula- 
tions controlling international payments, commodities transactions, and capi- 
tal movements became increasingly restrictive in the period immediately pre- 
ceding the devaluations. Third, it also reflects the generalized expectations 
that the situation is increasingly unsustainable and will result in an eventual 
devaluation. 
As the data on the real exchange rate, net foreign assets, and the current 
account clearly show (see table 8.5 above), the imposition of exchange con- 
trols and payments restrictions did not succeed in putting an end to the erosion 
of foreign reserves, nor did it succeed in halting the deteriorating situation in 
the country’s degree of international competitiveness. In fact, the data clearly 
suggest that these heightened impediments to trade managed, at most, to slow 
down the unavoidable crisis unleashed by  the inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies. Moreover, not only did exchange controls fail to halt the depletion 
of international reserves, but the available evidence suggests that an important 
negative side effect of  these trade restrictions and exchange controls is that 
they  introduced serious distortions into these economies, greatly  affecting 
their overall performance. 
17. The fact that the black market premium is lower for IMF devaluations would suggest that 
countries with an anticipated adjustment endorsed by an external institution may have lower cred- 
ibility problems in implementing a stabilization program than countries that do not. 423  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.6  Multiple Exchange Rates  and Parallel Premium before Devaluation 
No. of  Official 
Exchange Rates 
before 
Devaluation  Parallel Market Premium before Devaluation (%) 
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Tgble 8.6  (continued) 
No. of  Official 
Exchange Rates 
before 
Devaluation  Parallel Market Premium before Devaluation (%) 
Year  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  9 Mos.  3 MOS.  1 Mo. 
Yugoslavia  1961  3  3  18.6  18.6  26.5  58.2 
Yugoslavia  1965  2  2  N.A.  39.5  41.9  54.7 
Yugoslavia  1971  1  1  10.0  11.6  11.2  20.0 
Zaire  1967  2  2  164.7  208.8  247.0  261.7 
Source: Picks Currency Yearbook (several issues). 
8.2.4  Going to the Fund? Economic and Political Angles 
Why do some devaluing countries go to the IMF while others stay strictly 
away from it? Moreover, how can we explain why some countries request IMF 
assistance to tackle a particular crisis but decide to face other crises-appar- 
ently equally deep and serious-on  their own? In this subsection, we use our 
devaluation episodes data  set to  address these questions. In  principle, we 
would expect that the decision to approach the IMF for assistance would re- 
spond to a combination of economic and political considerations, including 
the  depth of  the  external crisis.  From a political economy perspective, it 
would be expected that the degree of instability of the political system, as well 
as other institutional variables, would affect the decision to approach the IMF. 
We  report results from a series of probit regressions aimed at trying to under- 
stand what determines the probability that a devaluing country will approach 
the IMF for assistance. 
To  the extent that the IMF provides technical assistance and financial sup- 
port, it is expected that the probability of approaching the IMF, conditional 
on the fact that adjustment will be undertaken, should depend on the following 
class of economic variables. (1) First is the availability of technical expertise 
in the country in question. The lower this availability, the higher the expected 
probability of approaching the IMF. The measurement of this variable is diffi- 
cult, and in the empirical analysis presented below we proxy it by each coun- 
try’s income per capita relative to that of  the United States.I8 (2) In general, 
we  would  expect  that,  the  deeper  the  external  sector  crisis-measured 
through the use of indicators such as changes in the current account and a loss 
in international competitiveness-the  higher the likelihood of  approaching 
the IMF. (3) The final factor is the availability of  foreign currency funds to 
withstand  the transition without  obtaining Fund  financing. Countries with 
18. The use of  relarive income per  capita stems from the fact that we are using a cross section 
of  devaluations that took place at different moments in time. 425  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
high reserves of foreign exchange or with higher borrowing ability will be in 
a better position to tackle a crisis on their own. We  proxy this variable by the 
relative level of available foreign assets the year before the devaluation. 
In addition to the economic variables discussed above, we would expect 
that the decision to approach the IMF will also depend on political and insti- 
tutional variables. An important implication of the recent work on the political 
economy of  stabilization is that countries with weaker, more unstable, and 
more polarized political systems will have greater difficulties in putting to- 
gether a credible stabilization program. There are two reasons for this: first, 
the more unstable the political system, the less binding the government’s rep- 
ururional constraint will become (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1990); sec- 
ond, countries with a more unstable political system will have a greater pro- 
clivity  to  rely  on  inflationary financing to  fund  public  expenditures (see 
Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). An important empirical implica- 
tion of  this approach to stabilization is that countries with a more unstable 
political regime will tend to have a higher probability of approaching the IMF. 
In this way, they will be able to obtain a “seal of  approval” for their stabiliza- 
tion and, thus, gain in credibility. In the empirical analysis reported above, we 
use a series of political variables to investigate this hypothesis. 
The modem public choice approach to international  organizations provides 
an additional rationale for considering political and institutional variables in 
explaining the probability of  requesting IMF assistance (see, e.g.,  Vaubel 
1986). According to this view, an important role of international  organizations 
is to do national governments’ “dirty work.” By involving multinational bod- 
ies in  the decision-making process, local politicians can shield themselves 
from the political fallout associated with unpopular policies.  l9  This implies 
that governments with a more unstable political base, and thus subject to suf- 
fering more heavily from unpopular policies, will recur more frequently to the 
IMF. A second implication of this public choice view is that, with other things 
given, countries with dictatorial regimes will have a smaller incentive to re- 
quest IMF assistance. This is because dictatorial regimes can, in general, 
withstand unpopular adjustment programs without suffering serious political 
consequences  (Vaubel  1986).  Finally,  ideological  considerations are  also 
likely to affect the decision to implement an IMF program. In general, we 
would expect that left-leaning governments would be less likely to approach 
the Fund.20 
In the probit analysis of IMF programs, the dependent variable took a value 
of one if the episode corresponded to an IMF devaluation and zero otherwise. 
The following political and economic variables were used as regressors (al- 
though not every one in every regression): 
19. All these propositions assume that local politicians associate some cost with yielding some 
20. An  abundance of political science papers look at the Fund program from an  ideological, 
of their power to the international bureaucracy. 










GDP per capita the year of the devaluation, relative to the U.S. GDP per 
capita that same year. Its sign is expected to be negative. These data were 
obtained from Summers and Heston (1988). 
Changes in  the real  exchange rate  index  in the two  years prior to the 
devaluation. The sign is expected to be negative, capturing the fact that 
countries with a more dramatic loss in international competitiveness are 
more likely to go to the IMF.*’ 
Change in the current account deficit in the three years prior to the crisis. 
Its sign is expected to be negative. 
The net foreign assets ratio the year before the crisis. This measures the 
availability of own resources to withstand the adjustment. Its sign is ex- 
pected  to  be  negative,  implying that  the  lower the  availability of  for- 
eign resources,  the higher the probability of  requesting  access to Fund 
financing. 
Index of  political unpopularity, measured as the incidence of  politically 
motivated strikes, protests, and demonstrations. This index was calculated 
on a per capita basis and was computed as the average between 1948 and 
the year prior to the devaluation. We  expect its coefficient to be positive. 
When alternative periodicities were used,  no  significant changes in the 
results were detected.  The raw  data used  for constructing this  and the 
other political indicators used in this analysis were taken from Taylor and 
Jodice (1983). 
Index of political violence, measured by  the incidence of  politically re- 
lated assassinations, attacks, and deaths. This index was calculated as was 
our variable 5, political instability, using the same source. We  also expect 
a positive coefficient. 
Frequency of  attempted coups d’Ctat  (both successful and unsuccessful). 
We take this to be an alternative measure of political instability and expect 
its coefficient to be positive. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the government in office 
is democratic and zero if dictatorial. We  expect its sign to be negative. 
An ideological index that measures whether the country in office is right, 
center, or left.**  This index takes a value of zero if the government is right 
wing, one if  it is of  centrist orientation, and two if  it is left wing. We 
expect its coefficient to be negative. 
Table 8.7 contains several probit regressions on IMF programs. The results 
obtained are quite encouraging: the x2  statistics indicate that the overall re- 
gressions are significant at conventional levels, and the majority of the coeffi- 
cients have the expected sign, although some of them are estimated somewhat 
21. Variables 2-4  were obtained from IFS. 
22. Of course, this type of  classification of  ideological inclination is always prone to some 
ambiguities. For example, how to classify Bourguiba’s government in Tunisia or Mobutu’s in 
Zaire? Our subjective analysis yielded a reduced number of leftist governments: those of Bour- 
guiba, Nasser, Ghandi, and Tito and Israel’s labor governments. 427  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.7  Probit Analysis for IMF Programs 
Constant 
Relative GDP per capita 
ARER 
ACurrent account 






Log likelihood ratio 
1.481 
(2.148) 
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(- 1.890) 













Note:  t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
imprecisely. Overall, these regressions do provide support for the view that 
both political and economic variables determine the probability of  going to 
the Fund. From the economic point of view, our estimations indicate that rel- 
ative GDP and net foreign asset position are the most important determinants 
in the decision to go to the Fund: poorer countries and countries facing a more 
severe exchange crisis have a higher probability of  requesting Fund assist- 
ance. Surprisingly, exchange rate appreciation and deterioration in the current 
account do not seem to be as important as the other economic  determinant^.^^ 
On the political side, table 8.7 shows that countries with a higher frequency 
of coups and less democratic regimes are more likely to undertake a program 
endorsed by the IMF. The two indices of political instability have the expected 
signs, but their standard errors are rather high. Finally, the coefficient of ide- 
ology variable is estimated very imprecisely and has the opposite sign to what 
we expected. Since it is very likely that countries with a long history of coups 
and political instability may lack reputation and suffer from more severe cred- 
23. These results are different from those obtained by Conway (1991), who finds that a higher 
current account deficit in  a previous period, among other things, is a significant determinant of 
participation in an IMF program. On the other hand, he finds that foreign exchange revenues were 
not significant. Conway does not control for the political determinants. Moreover, he does not use 
an episode as an observation, he studies only the period 1976-86, and he is not conditioning on a 
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ibility problems than countries with a history of  constitutional government 
transfers and political tranquility, the results obtained give some support to the 
idea of a “seal of approval” espoused in section 8.1. We  interpret these results 
as promising and suggestive. We believe that further formal empirical studies 
of the political economy of adjustment are likely to shed important new light 
on this area of inquiry. 
8.3  The “Effectiveness” of IMF-Sponsored and Unilateral Nominal 
Devaluations during the Bretton Woods Period 
Were these devaluations successful? Was  it worthwhile engaging in these 
programs? Is there any evidence that IMF devaluers fared any better than non- 
IMF countries? In this section, we  address these issues by  focusing on the 
behavior of the three sets of variables of section 8.2-real  exchange rates, net 
foreign assets, and current account ratios-for  the period immediately follow- 
ing our forty-eight devaluations. Although the great majority of the IMF pro- 
grams considered in this study were restricted to a one-year duration, we look 
at performance in the three-year period following each devaluation. The spirit 
of IMF programs is, of course, that, after the program is over, the country will 
continue to do well. We  start our analysis by investigating whether these de- 
valuations affected the real exchange rate. We then analyze the role of accom- 
panying macro policies and finally analyze the response of net foreign assets 
and the current account balance. In section 8.4,  we  look at some political 
aspects of adjustment. 
8.3.1 
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 deal with real exchange rate behavior during the three 
years following our forty-eight devaluation episodes. Table 8.8 presents the 
index of the bilateral (with respect to the U.S. dollar) real exchange rate one 
year before the devaluation, the year of  the devaluation, and one, two, and 
three years after the devaluation. As can be seen, in the majority of  cases 
(twenty of twenty-two non-IMF and twenty-one of twenty-six IMF episodes), 
the RER was higher (i.e., more depreciated) three years after the devaluation 
than the year prior to the devaluation. Moreover, in a large number of cases, 
by three years after the adjustment program the RER index exceeded its value 
three years prior to the devaluation. This provides preliminary information 
suggesting that these nominal devaluations were, as a group, largely success- 
ful in helping generate RER realignments. 
Table 8.9 looks at the issue of nominal and real devaluations from a differ- 
ent perspective. This table presents data on the cumulative ex post elasticity 
of the real exchange rate. This cumulative “effectiveness” index of  nominal 
devaluations is computed in the following form: 
Nominal Devaluations, Real Devaluations, and the External Sector 
RER, 
Ek 
Effectiveness Index,  = 7 429  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.8  Real Exchange Rate Indexes in  the Aftermath of Forty-eight 
Devaluation Episode 
Year  Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yrs.  3 Yrs. 
Country  Year  Prior  Year  After  After  After 
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Table 8.8  (continued) 
Year  Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yrs.  3 Yrs. 
Country  Year  Prior  Year  After  After  After 
Yugoslavia  1965  100.0  127.8  104.3  98.4  95.9 
Yugoslavia  1971  100.0  121.8  109.2  94.4  100.9 
Zaire  1967  100.0  222.9  152.3  148.3  141.7 
Sources: Constructed from raw data obtained from various issues of International Financial Sra- 
tistics. 
‘An increase in the index depicts real depreciation 
bA  new devaluation took place that year. Consequently, this value is not relevant in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the devaluations. 
where k refers to the number of years since the devaluation, RER, is the accu- 
mulated percentage change in the real exchange rate between the year prior to 
the devaluation and k years after the devaluation (k = 0, 1,2,3),  and E, is the 
accumulated percentage change in the nominal exchange rate during the same 
period. This elasticity provides an index of the degree of erosion experienced 
by the real exchange rate during the three years after the devaluation. A value 
of one means that the nominal exchange rate adjustment has been fully trans- 
ferred into a one-to-one real devaluation. A negative value of  the index, on 
the other hand, indicates that more than 100% of the nominal devaluation has 
been eroded and that, at that particular point, the real exchange rate is below 
its value one year before the crisis. The advantage of this indicator is that it 
measures the “effort,” in terms of nominal devaluation, that a country has had 
to make in order to achieve a 1% real depreciation. Consequently, it corrects 
for those cases where the discrete devaluation is followed by a crawling peg, 
where the authorities try to maintain a high level of the RER by  successive 
rounds of nominal devaluations and, most of the time, higher inflation. The 
actual value of this ex post elasticity index measures in a broad (and prelimi- 
nary) sense what percentage of the devaluation has been “effective.” 
As in table 8.8, the data in table 8.9 show a fairly high degree of effective- 
ness of nominal devaluations: in twenty-seven of the forty-eight episodes, the 
ex post RER elasticity is equal to or greater than one-half, one year after the 
devaluation. Three years after, twenty-six of the forty-eight countries have an 
effectiveness index that exceeds 0.33. For IMF countries, the median RER 
elasticity one year after the crisis was 0.49, while, for unilateral devaluers, 
the value was 0.57. The difference between the two groups is accentuated 
three years after the devaluation: the index is 0.23 for IMF devaluers and 0.50 
for non-IMF countries. 
The final outcome of  adjustment programs-including  the RER  effect of 
devaluations-will  largely depend on the accompanying macroeconomic pol- 
icies. If, as shown in Edwards (1989c), the nominal devaluation is accompa- 
nied by expansive macroeconomic policies, the real effect of the nominal de- 431  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
'LBble 8.9  Ex Post Real Exchange Rate Elasticities of Devaluations' 
Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yrs.  3 YE. 
Country  Year  Year  After  After  After 
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'lhble 8.9  (continued) 
Devaluation  1 Yr.  2 Yrs.  3 Yrs. 
Country  Year  Year  After  After  After 
Yugoslavia  1965  .42  .07  -  .02  -  .06 
Yugoslavia  1971  .61  .26  -  .23  .02 
Zaire  1967  .61  .26  .24  .21 
'See the text for explanations. 
bIncludes the effect of new devaluations that took place that year. 
valuation will tend to be eroded. Table 8.10 contains data for the three years 
following each devaluation on three of  the indicators of  domestic credit and 
fiscal policies considered in section 8.2: (a)  rate of growth of domestic credit; 
(b) rate of growth of domestic credit to the public sector; and (c)  proportion of 
total domestic credit received by the public sector. As can be seen, IMF deval- 
uers exhibit tighter macroeconomic policies than non-IMF countries. Interest- 
ingly enough, this difference across groups was maintained three years after 
the devaluation, even after most IMF programs had expired. It is also educa- 
tional to compare the evolution of macro indicators in the devaluing countries 
with the behavior of these indices for the control group of  twenty-four fixers. 
In half  the forty-eight episodes, the rate of  growth of  domestic credit was 
below the third quartile figure for the fixers both one and three years after the 
devaluation. 
In order to gain additional insights into the way in which macroeconomic 
policies and nominal devaluations affected the RER during these episodes, a 
number of cross-sectional regressions on the real exchange rate effect of nom- 
inal devaluations were estimated. These regressions take each devaluation epi- 
sode as an observation and consider the rate of  change of  the real exchange 
rate as the dependent variable. The independent variables include the rate of 
nominal devaluation, the rate of growth of domestic credit, the rate of growth 
of  domestic credit to the public sector, the change in  the  ratio of  the fiscal 
deficit to GDP, and a dummy (equal to one) in the presence of  an IMF pro- 
gram. The equations estimated were of the following form: 
RER, =  + (y,Ek  +  + ~,IMF  + U. 
RER, is the accumulated percentage change in the real exchange rate between 
the year prior to the devaluation and k years after the devaluation (for k = 1, 
2, 3 years), for episode n. E, is the percentage change of  the nominal ex- 
change rate during the same period, for episode n.  Given the nature of the data 
set used, in most stepwise devaluation cases E, = 8, = E3 = E = initial 
devaluation. A,  is a measure of  accumulated macroeconomic measures be- 
tween the year preceding the devaluation and year k. Among these measures, 
e stands for growth in domestic credit, CPS is growth of credit to the public 433  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
able  8.10  Maeraeconomic Policies after Devaluation Episodes 
Growth of  Ratio of 
Domestic Credit  Domestic Credit to 
to the  Public Sector to  Growth of 
Domestic Credit  Public Sector  Total Domestic Credit 
1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3Yrs. 
Country  Year  After  After  After  After  After  After 
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Table 8.10  (continued) 
Growth of  Ratio of 
Domestic Credit  Domestic Credit to 
Growth of  to the  Public Sector to 
Domestic Credit  Public Sector  Total Domestic Credit 
1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs. 













1970  11.9  13.0  5.0 
1959  9.2  15.7  2.4 
1964  14.2  7.2  11.1 
1970  20.8  22.0  29.9 
1963  55.7  5.9  15.4 
1971  87.5  -83.3  60.0 
1961  36.8  10.0  150.0 
1965  25.2  16.3  22.4 
1971  18.6  23.4  53.8 
1967  11.2  29.1  10.0 
16.6  13.1  18.5 
22.2  12.8  23.5 
-47.7 
-3.8 










14.4  5.8 
40.6  30.4 
33.0  28.1 
19.4  10.1 
10.9  19.4 
17.8  181.8 
19.2  12.1 
9.4  6.4 
7.6  7.8 
80.7  69.7 
22.0  19.5 
26.8  28.5 
Source: Constructed from several issues of Infernafional  Financial Statistics. 
sector, and DEF is the change in the fiscal deficit. IMF is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if  the episode in question corresponds to an IMF 
devaluation. The results from this type of equation allow us to get an idea of 
the average effects of the nominal devaluations on the RER maintaining other 
macroeconomic variables constant. The results obtained from the estimation 
of this equation are presented in table 8.1  1. 
Overall, these regressions are quite revealing. Controlling for macro poli- 
cies, the nominal devaluation exerts a strong influence on the real exchange 
rate, although its effect diminishes from around 0.68 in the year of the deval- 
uation  to  approximately  0.15  after  three  years.  Moreover,  these  results 
strongly confirm the key role of macroeconomic policies in adjustment pro- 
grams. In every equation but one, the macro variables had a negative coeffi- 
cient, and in many significantly so. If macroeconomic policies are expansive, 
it is likely-as  was the case with the Argentinian devaluations of  1959, 1962, 
and 1970, the Brazilian devaluation of  1967, or the Yugoslav devaluations of 
1961 and 1965 and others depicted in table 8.8 above-that  the real effect of 
the nominal devaluation will be rapidly eroded. 
In order to analyze whether the IMF exerts an independent effect over the 
real exchange rate in the period following the devaluation, we added an IMF 
variable to the regressions in table 8.11. In every case, the coefficient of this 
dummy turned out to be insignificant, indicating that, apart from its influence 
through macroeconomic policies, the IMF does not appear to have an inde- 
pendent effect  on the RER. This dummy may be capturing an additional factor 435  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.11  Nominal Devaluations, Macroeconomic  Policies, the IMF, and Real 
Devaluations: Cross-Episode Regressions (ordinary least squares) 
Const.  4  c  cis,  DEF,  IMF  R2 
A.  k = Oyears 
.063  .689  -.0006 
(1.362)  (13.273)  (- ,614) 
,061  ,684  ... 
(1.302)  (13.235) 
B. k  = 1 year 
.209  .484  -.008 
(3.355)  (7.992)  (-4.366) 
,146  .411  ... 
(2.262)  (6.748) 
C.  k  = 2 years 
,334  ,358  -.014 
(5.184)  (7.799)  (-5.195) 
,187  ,308  ... 
(2.842)  (6.082) 
D.  k = 3 years 
,408  .093  -.w 
(4.160)  (2.677)  (-2.332) 
,314  ,162 
(4.421)  (4.019) 
~~ 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
... 
-  .oO01 
(- .112) 
... 
-  .004 
(- 3.447) 
... 
-  ,005 
( -  3.180) 
... 
-  ,008 
(- 3.355) 
-  ,009 
(- .715) 
-  ,005 
(- ,465) 
-  .019 
(-1.380) 
-  .024 
(- 1.533) 
-  ,029 
(- 1.862) 
-  ,022 
(- I.  199) 
,005 
(.305) 
-  ,011 
(- .630) 
-  ,065 
(-1.247) 
-  .073 
(- 1.308) 
-  ,099 
( -  1.477) 


















consistent with our analysis of  the determinants of the use of IMF credit. In 
section 8.2, we noted how countries with more critical economic and political 
conditions were more likely to rely on the Fund, and therefore the negative 
sign of the IMF dummy in table 8.11 may indicate a reversion to that state of 
economic and political instability once the Fund program expired. Further 
evidence in section 8.4  will shed some light on this issue. 
8.3.2  Devaluation Programs and the External Sector 
The ultimate goal of an adjustment-cum-devaluation  program is to generate 
an improvement in the external position of  the country. Table 8.12 contains 
summary data on the evolution of the ratio of the current account balance to 
GDP and the ratio of net foreign assets to money after the devaluation. These 
indicators give the accumulated changes of  the levels of these variables one, 
two, and three years after the crisis from their levels one year before the de- 436  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8.12  Current Account and Net Foreign Assets Behavior in the Three Years 
Following the Forty-eight Devaluation Episodes 
1 Year  2 Years  3 Years 
Non-  Non-  Non- 
IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF 
A. Change in current account balancelGDP' 
First quartile  .4  -2.8  -  .2  -3.5  -  1.3  -3.6 
Median  1.9  -  1.2  1.2  .3  .6  -1.2 
Third quartile  3.2  1.1  3.0  2.1  4.0  2.3 
Mean  2.2  -  .9  1.8  -  .9  1.3  -1.1 
B. Change in net foreign asset ratio" 
First quartile  -  6.3  -4.1  -  3.7  -4.4  -  4.6  -  4.6 
Median  .4  1.3  2.7  -.I  2.8  -  .8 
Mean  .9  3.1  1.9  2.3  4.2  -  1.6 
Third quartile  3.8  10.7  9.8  8.2  10.2  5.3 
Sources: Constructed from raw data obtained from IFS. 
'Relative to one year prior to devaluation. 
valuation. These data show important differences in behavior across IMF and 
non-IMF devaluers. While, on average, those countries that requested IMF 
assistance experienced a fast and significant current account improvement, 
most non-IMF countries did not see an improvement even three years after the 
devaluation. By  the  third  year,  fifteen of  twenty-six IMF devaluers had  a 
stronger current account position than the year before the devaluation. The 
average improvement was, in fact, 1.3 percentage points of GDP. After three 
years, however, the majority of  the non-IMF devaluers (thirteen of  twenty- 
two) had experienced a worsening in the current account ratio. (Table 8A.  1 in 
the appendix contains the detailed data for the individual countries.) This dif- 
ference in behavior across both groups of devaluers is formally picked up by 
a battery of x2  tests. For one year after the devaluations, the ~~(2)  had a value 
of  6.7, while it was 4.5 for three years after the crisis, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that both groups come from the same population at conventional 
significance levels.24 
The data on net foreign assets, displayed in panel B of table 8.12, show a 
slightly different story, with non-IMF countries having a stronger performance 
in the early years. After three years, however, the majority of the countries in 
both groups had experienced an improvement in their net foreign asset posi- 
tion, with IMF devaluers having fared, on average, substantially better than 
24. These results coincide with other studies that have investigated the effects of IMF programs. 
One of  the most recent ones (Conway, 1991) also finds a striking improvement in the current 
account in the period 1976-86. 437  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
non-IMF countries (for detailed information on the performance of individual 
countries, see table 8.A.1 in the appendix). Those countries that did not ex- 
perience an improvement in their current account and net foreign asset posi- 
tions correspond largely to those that failed to generate a real exchange cor- 
rection and maintained expansive macro policies. 
8.4  The Political Economy of Failed Devaluations 
Although the broad picture that emerges from our previous analysis is one 
of  overall effectiveness in  the  majority of  the adjustment-cum-devaluation 
programs, the sample includes some spectacular failures. In this section, we 
address this issue, trying to understand why in some countries the programs 
failed so precipitously while in others they attained varying degrees of  suc- 
cess. We  start by classifying the forty-eight episodes into successful and failed 
programs. We  then provide an analysis of the extent to which political devel- 
opment in  these nations can help explain these differences in program out- 
comes. Our empirical analysis is motivated by the new literature on the polit- 
ical economy of macroeconomic policy.  Since it is based on limited data, the 
analysis should be considered as preliminary and  somewhat tentative. We 
think, however, that it provides some interesting results, suggesting that this 
is a promising avenue for further empirical investigations. 
8.4.1  Successful and Unsuccessful Devaluations 
In this section, we attempt to classify our forty-eight episodes as “success- 
ful” or “unsuccessful” devaluations. To  do this, we have concentrated on the 
behavior of three key indicators during the period following the devaluations: 
1. Real exchange rates (with a focus on the effectiveness index reported in 
2.  Net foreign assets of the monetary system; 
3.  Current account as a percentage of GDP. 
An  episode was defined as a failure if  in any of  the three years after the 
devaluation more than 90% of the real exchange rate effect of the devaluation 
had been eroded-that  is, the effectiveness index is less than 0.1-or  if, even 
when the effectiveness index was above 0.1, both the net foreign assets and 
the current account positions had worsened three years after the devaluation.z5 
All other episodes were classified as having been effective. However, in order 
to have a finer analysis, these “effective” programs were divided into two 
groups: “successful” and  “limited success.” Successful countries are those 
where the real exchange rate elasticity of the devaluation exceeded 0.3 after 
three years and where the current account or net foreign assets exhibited an 
table 8.9 above); 
25. Colombia’s devaluation in 1965 did not conform to this classification but was nevertheless 
classified as a failure because Colombia had to devalue again in 1967. 438  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A.  Santaella 
improvement three years after the crisis. All the rest of  the countries were 
classified as having limited success. This specific definition of  success and 
failure-like  any other such classification-is  somewhat arbitrary. However, 
by using these indicators, we have concentrated on the most immediate targets 
of devaluations. The cutoff points allowed us to be “generous” with respect to 
strictly “successful” devaluations while at the same time being strict in the 
consideration of unsuccessful devaluations. 
Table 8.13 contains the forty-eight episodes classified according to this cri- 
terion. As can be seen, among the twenty-two non-IMF devaluers, there are 
eight clear-cut successful cases, six clear-cut failures, and eight limited suc- 
cess cases. For the twenty-six IMF devaluers, there are eight clear-cut suc- 
Table 8.13  Successful and Unsuccessful Devaluation Episodes 
Country  Year 
















































Country  Year 
B. IMF devaluers 
1. Successful: 
Colombia  1967 
Ecuador  1970 
Ghana  1967 
Mexico  1954 
Philippines  1962 
Philippines  1970 
Spain  1959 
’hrkey  1970 
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cessful episodes, twelve unsuccessful ones, and six cases of limited success. 
Out of the twelve unsuccessful IMF devaluers, four had their programs can- 
celed: Argentina in 1959 and 1962, Peru in 1958, and Yugoslavia in 1971. 
Our analysis has placed great emphasis on the role of accompanying mac- 
roeconomic policies when evaluating the degree of success of  a devaluation. 
In order to investigate the relation between success and macroeconomic poli- 
cies formally, a series of x2  tests was performed. The results obtained are quite 
supportive of the view that macroeconomic policies make a difference in the 
degree of effectiveness that a devaluation achieves. For many of the monetary 
and fiscal indicators included, it is possible to reject (at conventional levels of 
confidence) the  null  hypothesis that  “effective” and  “failed” devaluations 
come from the same population. This is especially the case for the annual 
growth of domestic credit in the year after the devaluations (x2 = 6.8)  as well 
as three years after (x2  = 5.3). 
8.4.2  Political Instability and Failed Adjustment 
Naturally, the statement that some devaluation programs failed because the 
authorities did not implement, alongside the devaluation, consistent macro- 
economic policies begs the question as to why  this was the case. Why are 
some countries able to regain fiscal and credit disciplines while others are 
unable (or unwilling) to do so. 
An  important empirical implication of  some of  the new  literature on the 
political economy of  stabilization is that countries with weaker,  more un- 
stable, and more polarized political systems will generally face greater diffi- 
culties in implementing the fiscal adjustment required for a devaluation to be 
successful. The reason for this is that, in more unstable countries with weaker 
governments, it will be difficult to come to a decision on which groups should 
bear a higher percentage of the adjustment costs. Thus, countries with weaker 
and more polarized political systems will either delay the adjustment or not 
carry it out as originally designed (Alesina and Drazen 1991). 
In order to investigate these implications of the theory, we used the data set 
compiled by Taylor and Jodice (1983) to define a number of political variables 
for the period following the adjustment. In particular, we  are interested in 
obtaining data capturing, on the one hand, the degree of political resistance 
generated by  the adjustment program and, on the other hand, the extent to 
which the government repressed dissidents. We  also obtained information on 
whether there was a coup attempt in the period immediately following the 
devaluation. 
Table 8.14  contains data on five indices of political instability for the forty- 
six episodes for which we have data. As can be seen, “failure” countries 
indeed appear to have a more unstable political structure: the frequency of 
politically motivated strikes and riots there is higher than in the “effective” 
devaluation countries. Additionally, in the unsuccessful countries, the govern- 440  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8.14  Indices of Political Instability and Weakness in 
Devaluation Episodes: Means. 
1 Yr. After Devaluation  3 Yrs. after Devaluation 
Successful  Limited  Failed  Successful  Limited  Failed 
1. Politically motivated strikes  .06  .04  .I0  .02  .oo  .I3 
2. Political demonstrations and  .26  .09  .37  .I0  .70  .21 




4. Index of government trans-  .60  .54  .61  .67  .31  .83 
5. Index of coup attempts  .27  .23  .67  .oo  .23  .28 
Source: Constructed from data obtained from Taylor and Jodice (1983). 
‘There were no data on the two Korean episodes. 
ments tried to exercise stricter control of  dissidence. Finally, “failure” epi- 
sodes experienced a higher incidence of coups. In fact, it is quite impressive 
how  many “failure” episodes were followed by a coup attempt: Argentina’s 
four episodes, Colombia in  1965, Ecuador in  1961, Uruguay in  1963 and 
1971, and Ghana in 1971. 
In order to gain additional insights into the influence of political instability 
and weakness on the outcome of devaluation episodes, we estimated a series 
of  probit regressions. The dependent variable was defined as a dummy that 
took a value of one if the episode was classified as being either a “success” or 
a “limited success” and a value of zero if the episode was a failure. In addition 
to the political instability and weakness variables in table 8.14, we  also in- 
cluded our measures of political ideology, democracy, and IMF presence from 
section 8.2.3 at the time of the devaluation. As a way to reduce serious simul- 
taneity problems, we restricted the independent variables to one year after the 
devaluation. The results obtained from this analysis are in table 8.15. 
As can be seen, the results are quite interesting. Every coefficient has the 
expected sign, and a number of  them are significant at conventional levels, 
providing some  (preliminary) support to  the  view  that  governments  with 
greater political instability and weakness have more difficulty implementing 
successful adjustment. What is particularly interesting is that these results 
suggest that, with other things given, countries that had a democratic rule at 
the time of the devaluation have a greater probability of success, although the 
coefficient is estimated quite imprecisely. This implies that, in order to “put 
the house in order” and in implementing adjustment programs based on finan- 
cial discipline, there is no need to eschew democracy. This point was made 
forcefully by Carlos Diaz Alejandro in the early 1980s, when the pessimism 
associated with the debt crisis created doubt about the probability of  coexis- 
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Table 8.15  Probit Analysis of E5ectiveness and Failure of Devaluation Programs 
Eq. (1)  Es.  (2) 
Constant  5.82  ,584 
(1.455)  (1.540) 
(- 322)  (- ,823) 
(- ,893)  (- 394) 
Repression  -  ,106  -.lo6 
( -  1.085)  (- 1.010) 
coups  -  .400  -  .400 
Riots  -  .271  -  ,271 
Strikes  -  1.331  -  1.331 
(- 1.523)  (-1,531) 
Democracy  ,270  ,271 
(  .623)  (  ,627) 
(.010) 
Ideology  ,003  ... 
X2  7.530  7.530 
Note:  t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
8.5  Bretton Woods and After: A Preliminary Comparison 
of Inflation and Growth 
At the time the Bretton Woods system was abandoned, a number of observ- 
ers thought that a more flexible regime would generate more efficient adjust- 
ment paths. The main idea was that greater flexibility in exchange rate man- 
agement  would  allow  countries  to  correct  external  imbalances  without 
incurring “unnecessary” reductions in  real  income.  In  a  sentence, it  was 
thought that a greater flexibility would “reduce the real costs of  adjustment.” 
On the other hand, a minority of analysts pointed out that moving away from 
fixed parities was likely to generate an increase in worldwide inflation.26  Oth- 
ers, however, argued that this did not have to be the case and that countries 
could maintain low inflation through monetary discipline. 
Now  that enough time has elapsed since the demise of  the Bretton Woods 
regime, we can look back and ask whether the move to a system of exchange 
rate flexibility indeed reduced the “real costs of adjustment” without greatly 
affecting inflation. In this section, we address this issue by undertaking a pre- 
liminary, but nevertheless suggestive, comparison of our forty-eight devalua- 
tions during the Bretton Woods period with a series of  devaluations under- 
taken during the decade that followed the collapse of the fixed rate system. 
The sample of devaluations that occurred during the turbulent 1970s and early 
1980s was obtained from Edwards (19894 and includes seventeen episodes.27 
26. Some of these debates are summarized in de Vries (1987). 
27. The exact devaluations are Bolivia in 1972, 1979, and  1982, Chile in 1982, Costa Rica in 
1974, Ecuador  in  1982, Egypt in  1979, Indonesia in  1978, Jamaica in  1978, Kenya in  1981, 
Korea in  1980, Mexico in  1976 and 1982, Nicaragua in  1979, Pakistan in  1972 and  1982, and 
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Owing to space restrictions, and in order to concentrate on some of the more 
controversial aspects of this debate, we focus exclusively on inflation and real 
GDP growth. 
Table 8.16 contains data on growth and inflation in the three-year period 
following the devaluations. As before, the data are disaggregated for the IMF 
and unilateral devaluers. Simple inspection reveals that, in the post-Bretton 
Woods era, output tended to decline more sharply in the period immediately 
following the devaluation. However, in both periods, the rate of  economic 
growth recovered its pace after three years. The recovery also seems to be less 
dynamic during the post-Bretton Woods period. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that the external environment was less supportive in the 1970s 
and 1980s and, in particular, that both GDP in industrial countries and world 
trade were growing at lower rates after 1971 than during the 1960s. In fact, 
GDP in industrial countries grew on average 4.6% per year during 1955-71, 
while it grew only 2.8% during 1971-82. 
The differences in GDP growth rates become minor when compared to the 
differences in inflation. As seen in table 8.16, inflation is always higher during 
the post-Bretton Woods period, and the inflationary effect of the devaluation 
is significantly more substantial during the 1970s and early 1980s than under 
the fixed exchange rate system. Of course, to a large extent the reason for this 
is that, after the Bretton Woods collapse, there was no longer an institutional 
setting that helped maintain cross-exchange rates constant.28  In fact, the de- 
valuers of  this period resorted more to crawling pegs than to stepwise deval- 
uations, further fueling inflationary pressures. Another important aspect of 
table 8.1 is that the behavior of IMF and unilateral devaluers follows the broad 
cross-period description outlines above, although there are some differences 
within periods. The rate of growth of GDP was lower the year of the devalua- 
tion for IMF devaluers than for the non-IMF episodes in the Bretton Woods 
group, but it picked up very quickly and even exceeded the performance of 
the unilateral devaluers one year after the devaluation. This recovery was not 
as prominent in the decade after Bretton Woods.29 
8.6  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated empirically the historical circumstances 
surrounding forty-eight major discrete devaluations in the developing coun- 
tries during the Bretton Woods period. We  looked at both the conditions lead- 
ing to these devaluations and the external sector performance in the period 
following the adjustment. Four aspects of devaluation programs were ana- 
28. On the variability of  the nominal and real exchange rates for these different institutional 
settings, see Edwards (1989a). 
29. Again,  this is consistent with Conway (1991), who finds a significant contemporaneous 
reduction in economic growth during an IMF program but a positive, although weaker, effect later 
on. He also finds an increase in the rate of  inflation with increased participation in IMF programs. 443  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
Table 8.16  Growth and Inflation Following Devaluation Episodes: The Bretton Woods 
Period and One Decade Later 
Year of 
Devaluation  1 Yr. After  2 Yrs. After  3 Yrs. After 
Non-  Non-  Non-  Non- 
IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF  IMF 
I. The Bretton Woods period 
A. Growth of GDP: 
First quartile  .3  2.4 
Median  3.3  4.7 
Third quartile  5.5  9.5 
Mean  2.7  5.3 
First quartile  4.7  2.2 
Median  8.5  9.5 
Third quartile  21.9  13.4 
Mean  15.8  9.7 
B . Rate of inflation: 
II. One decade afrer Bretton Woods 
A. Growth of GDP: 
First quartile  -4.4  -  1.2 
Median  .5  2.1 
Third quartile  4.4  5.6 
Mean  -  1.8  1.1 
B. Rate of inflation: 
First quartile  5.9  9.5 
Median  11.8  18.0 
Third quartile  48.2  29.0 
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Source: Constructed from raw data obtained from International Financial Statistics. 
aIncludes  the Bolivian hyperinflation. 
lyzed in detail. First, we investigated whether there are differences between 
countries that devalued within the framework of IMF programs and those that 
undertook devaluations unilaterally. Second, we made an effort to determine 
whether, in general, devaluations were an effective policy tool that facilitated 
these countries' adjustment. Third, we analyzed what the economic determi- 
nants of successful devaluations are. Finally, we investigated the role of polit- 
ical economy developments, and, in particular, political instability, in deter- 
mining the degree of success of stabilization programs. 
Our analysis shows that those countries that approached the IMF for assist- 
ance were initially facing a deeper economic crisis than those countries that 
decided to face the imbalances on their own: they had suffered greater losses 
in  competitiveness, suffered deeper worsening in the current account, and 
reached more serious levels in their net foreign asset positions. Additionally, 
we found that countries with a more unstable political history had  a greater 
probability of approaching the IMF. We  interpreted this finding as providing 444  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
some support for the view that countries with a record of political instability 
have greater difficulties designing credible adjustment programs; as a result, 
they have a greater incentive to obtain a “seal of approval” as a substitute for 
reputation. 
Given the above discussion, it is perhaps not too surprising that the IMF 
countries engineered, on average, larger devaluations. In our analysis of the 
aftermath of these crises, we follow these countries for a period of four years. 
Our results show that, in general, these devaluations were quite “successful”: 
in the majority of the countries, the RER was realigned, the current account 
balance improved, and the net  foreign assets position became stronger. On 
average, IMF devaluers experienced greater improvements in the external sec- 
tor indicators. 
Our data analysis clearly shows that a key element in determining the de- 
gree of a devaluation program is the package of policies implemented along- 
side it. The data show that IMF devaluers were more conservative, imple- 
menting, in general, tighter macroeconomic policies. However, and perhaps 
surprisingly, we also found that IMF devaluers were more prone to inflation- 
ary pressures, as evinced by the erosion of their real devaluations. 
Although our investigation shows unequivocally that these historical deval- 
uations were,  in general, successful, it also shows that, during this period, 
there were a large number of  fundamental failures. Invariably, these failures 
were related to an inability (or unwillingness) to implement consistent fiscal 
and macro policies. In section 8.5, we provide some preliminary analyses that 
tries to explain these failures in terms of political economy developments. We 
found that, in general, countries that experienced a greater degree of political 
instability in the period following the crisis, especially with respect to coup 
attempts, tended to end up having an unsuccessful experience. The govern- 
ment’s weakness does not allow these nations to withstand the criticism asso- 
ciated with the program. Interestingly enough, we  found that, although the 
degree of political instability following the crisis plays a role in explaining 
success, the historical political environment was less important. Another find- 
ing in this section is that, with other things given, countries with a democratic 
regime at the moment of the devaluation have a higher probability of success. 
Finally, this study suggests quite clearly that the hopes that the post-Bretton 
Woods regime would allow for a reduction in the “real costs of  adjustment” 
were not met. 
Although this study has not addressed directly the current debate on the 
merits of returning to greater exchange rate fixity in the LDCs, it has dealt in 
detail with the economics of devaluation in a fixed exchange rate context. Our 
evaluation of the causes of “fundamental disequilibria,” the LDCs relationship 
with the IMF, and the politics and economics of exchange rate adjustment has 
shown that, at least with respect to these areas, Bretton Woods was not as bad 
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Appendix 
The Forty-Eight Devaluation Episodes: 
A Brief Description 
In this appendix, we  provide a brief  description of  the circumstances sur- 
rounding our forty-eight devaluations (for details on the devaluation episodes, 
see table 8A.  1). The information presented here has been obtained from vari- 
ous sources, and especially from various issues of Pick’s Currency Yearbook 
and the IMF Report on  Exchange Restrictions. 
1. Argentina  1955. On  28 October 1955, almost one month after over- 
throwing Per6n’s government, a new  regime implemented an economic re- 
form that included a devaluation. The official price of the dollar was increased 
to 18.00 pesos, replacing three previous official rates (5.00, 7.50, and 13.95 
pesos). Multiple export rates were maintained, while a special import rate and 
an open fluctuating free market were created. The latter closed the year at 
36.00 pesos to the dollar. 
2. Argentina  1959. On 30 December 1958, Frondizi abolished the basic 
official rate that had been set at 18.00 pesos per dollar and initiated an auster- 
ity  program  based  on  conservative monetary  management.  The  “uncon- 
trolled” free rate had closed in  1958 at 40.00 pesos to the dollar, and a freely 
fluctuating exchange rate was created on 2 January 1959. The value of  the 
dollar opened in this market at around 65.00 pesos, and it closed the year at 
83.00 pesos. Differential rates for exports and imports were maintained. 
3. Argentina 1962. After two years of a stable currency, a full crisis devel- 
oped in early 1962, and Frondizi was ousted by  the military. New  austerity 
measures and exchange restrictions were implemented, and  official support 
for the peso was withdrawn from the freely fluctuating market on 19 March 
1962. The exchange rate dipped to 134.00 pesos per dollar after having closed 
1961 with a parity of 83.02. 
4. Argentina 1970. A period of currency stability starting in  1967 came to 
an end in 1969, when inflationary pressures resurfaced again. On 1 January 
1970, a new currency was introduced: the peso Argentino, equal to one hun- 
dred old pesos. The official exchange rate was devalued from 3.50 to 4.00 
pesos to the dollar on  18 June 1970. This parity was again affected during 
1971, when, after a period of  political crisis in the military government, a 
series of  mini-devaluations were  implemented. At  that time, multiple ex- 
change rates were imposed. 
5. Brazil  1967. The cruzeiro experienced a period of  surprising stability 
after the  1965 devaluation. However, inflation was  not  eliminated, and  a 
devaluation-cum-currency reform was  implemented on  13 February  1967. 
The official parity  was  cut from  2,2 10.00/2,220.00 to  2,700.00/2,2  15  .OO 
cruzeiros per dollar, and a new “hard” cruzeiro, equal to one thousand old 446  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Table 8A.1  Change in Current Account and Net Foreign Assets Ratios 
Changes from Year Prior to Devaluation 
Current Account  Net Foreign 
Ratio  Assets Ratio 
1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs. 
Country  Year  After  After  After  After 
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Table 8A.1  (continued) 
Changes from Year Prior to Devaluation 
Current Account  Net Foreign 
Ratio  Assets Ratio 
1 Yr.  3 Yrs.  1 Yr.  3 Yrs. 
Country  Year  After  After  After  After 
Turkey  1970  .4  3.5  2.6  6.7 
Uruguay  1963  3.7  7.8  -4.9  -  18.1 
Uruguay  1971  1.4  -  1.6  10.0  10.0 
Yugolsavia  1961  .4  -1.0  3.7  .o 
Yugoslavia  1965  I .9  .7  .5  .3 
Yugoslavia  1971  2.8  -5.4  1.7  .7 
Zaire  1967  24.9  -2.0  33.8  33.7 
Source: Constructed from raw data obtained from International Financial Statistics. 
units, was  introduced. Growing fiscal and trade deficits forced tighter cur- 
rency controls and a new devaluation on 28 December, when the new rate was 
set at 3.20 cruzeiros to the dollar. 
6. Chile 1962. A reversion to a dual rate system was implemented by  the 
Alessandri administration on 15 January 1962 in order to cope with exchange 
rate pressures. The external imbalance was not completely contained, and on 
15 October the Central Bank ceased supporting the official bank rate set at 
1.05 escudos to the dollar, which was thus put on a fluctuating basis, reaching 
initially a level of  1.395 and closing the year at 1.66 escudos per dollar. The 
broker’s (free) rate closed 1962 with a dollar value of 2.41 escudos. 
7. Colombia 1957. The introduction of the exchange certificate in late 1956 
did not solve Colombia’s payments conditions. In May 1957, President Rojas 
fell, and the new government enacted a new currency reform on 18 June. The 
former basic rate of  2.50 pesos per dollar was abolished, and a new system 
of multiple rates was created. The system was based on the exchange certifi- 
cate, which was set initially at 4.88 pesos to the dollar and reached 5.20 in 
December. 
8. Colombia 1962. The newly inaugurated government of  Leon Valencia 
tried to handle the pressure on exchange reserves by adopting a “stabilization” 
package during 1962. The measures undertaken proved to be insufficient, and 
on 20 November and 21 December the exchange rate system was modified, 
with the exchange certificate being devalued from 6.5016.71 to 7.10/9.00 pe- 
sos per dollar. The coffee and other rates underwent similar adjustments. 
9, Colombia 1965. During 1965, Colombia experienced economic and po- 
litical hardships. To face the shortage of foreign exchange, the coffee rate was 
adjusted first in March and then subsequently during the year. In May, a state 
of siege was declared, and the National Front Coalition, still under Leon Val- 448  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A.  Santaella 
encia, all but collapsed, worsening the financial crisis. In July, more stringent 
capital controls and government budget adjustments were announced, and on 
2 September the exchange certificate auction system was replaced by  a dual 
system of preferential and intermediate official rates alongside the fluctuating 
free rate. The preferential rate was  set initially at 9.00 pesos per dollar and 
equal to the old selling rate of the exchange certificate. The intermediate rate 
was established at 13.50 pesos to the dollar. 
10. Colombia 1967. To reduce the drain of  reserves, a controlled capital 
market rate was established in late 1966, in fact abolishing the free exchange 
market rate. On 22 March 1967, President Lleras Restrepo announced a new 
economic program that included a new exchange rate structure. The interme- 
diate rate of  13.50 pesos per dollar was replaced by  a certificate market rate 
that was established initially at the same rate but that was allowed to fluctuate, 
reaching 15.79 in December. The coffee rate was abolished, but other rates 
continued to function. 
11. Costa Rica 1961. On 2 September, 196 1, Costa Rica devalued the colon 
from a par of 5.60 per dollar to one of 6.625 to the dollar. The multiple ex- 
change rate system, which had been in effect for many years (although it had 
been simplified a number of times), came to an end. 
12. Ecuador  1961. Banana  and  cacao  exports  fell  dramatically during 
1961, forcing the government of  Velasco Ibarra to restrict imports, tighten 
credit, raise revenues, and cut public expenditures. On 14 July the sucre was 
devalued from  15.00 to  18.00 units to the dollar. This parity applied to all 
exports and imports, while the use of  the free fluctuating rate was narrowed 
and mixed rates were abolished. The austerity measures improved the eco- 
nomic conditions but prompted the ouster of the chief executive in November 
by Arosemena Monroy. 
13. Ecuador 1970. In order to meet deep budgetary problems, the new 
Velasco  Ibarra  administration  introduced emergency tax  measures.  Chal- 
lenged by  Congress and the Supreme Court, Velasco Ibarra took dictatorial 
powers in May  1970. To further handle economic problems, the sucre was 
devalued on 17 August. The official rate (18.00 sucres per dollar) and all other 
multiple rates were unified at 25.00 units per dollar, ending the ten-year-old 
de jure dual rate system and the de fact0 multiple rate regime. On 22 Novem- 
ber 1971, the dual system was reinstated. 
14. Egypt 1962. After Nasser’s extensive nationalization program in previ- 
ous years, the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961 and 
severe trade deficits created a delicate economic situation in 1962. In January 
the government decreed the repatriation of all national bank notes, and on 7 
May a devaluation was effected. The numerous export and import rates were 
replaced by an effective single exchange rate, in which the basic official rate 
of 2.87 dollars per pound was depreciated to a new parity of  2.30 dollars to 
the pound. 
15. Ghana 1967. The military government that deposed Nkrumah in Feb- 449  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
ruary 1966 tried to carry out a deflationary program to relieve pressures on the 
foreign exchange market. In February 1967, a new currency was introduced: 
the new cedi, with a parity of  1.40 units per dollar. This rate was reduced on 
8 July to a new value of 0.98 dollars. Later in  1967, a tax reform to induce 
foreign investment was adopted. 
16. Ghana 1971. The civilian rule under Busia failed to improve the social 
and economic conditions of Ghana. The cocoa crisis of  1971 had to be faced, 
with unpopular taxes and a series of partial devaluations implemented through 
export bonuses, taxes on remittances, and tourist rates. Following the floating 
of the U.S. dollar on 15 August, Ghana kept its link to the pound sterling until 
4  November, when this tie was broken and the official rate of 0.98 dollar per 
cedi was reinstated. An additional drop in cocoa prices forced a huge deval- 
uation on 27 December, when the new official rate was set at 0.55 dollars to 
the cedi. The devaluation prompted a coup on 12 January 1971, by Acheam- 
pong, who, once in power, revalued the cedi to a new parity of 0.78 dollars. 
17. India 1966. Indira Gandhi, who had become prime minister in January 
1966, devalued the rupee on 6 June from 4.75 to 7.50 units to the dollar. This 
measure was supported by a five-year plan and was seen as an attempt to put 
an end to a long situation of  monetary instability, food shortages, and pay- 
ments difficulties. 
18. Indonesia 1970. Thanks to the oil boom of  1969, the foreign exchange 
market, gross monetary reserves, the payments situation, and tax revenues 
had improved in Indonesia. This allowed a simplification of the exchange rate 
structure on 17 April 1970. The export bonus certificate rate (327.00 rupiahs 
per dollar) and the complementary foreign exchange rate (378.00) were re- 
placed by  the new  flexible general exchange rate (378.00) and the flexible 
credit exchange rate (326.00). On 10 December the exchange rate was unified 
to the flexible general exchange rate of 378.00 rupiahs per dollar, applicable 
to all exchange transactions. 
19. Israel 1962. In order to meet upward price pressures that had intensified 
in  1961, as well as the requirement on the recent GATT membership, Ben 
Gurion’s government devalued the Israeli pound. On 9 February 1962, the 
parity was lowered from 1.80 to 3  .OO  pounds per dollar, and existing multiple 
exchange rates were abolished. The action was also accompanied by a partial 
liberalization  of imports. 
20. Israel 1967. The Israeli economic upsurge, prompted by the spectacular 
military victory of Israel in June, was interrupted by the British pound deval- 
uation. Israel matched that devaluation by  reducing its exchange rate from 
3.00 to 3.50 pounds to the dollar on 19 November 1967. 
21. Israel 1971. Four years of explosive economic expansion had deterio- 
rated substantially the balance of payments and fueled inflationary pressures. 
Following the floating of the dollar on 15 August 1971, the pound was deval- 
ued from 3.50 to 4.20 units to the dollar, effective 21 August. Golda Meir’s 
government complemented this measure with a credit squeeze, severe price 450  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
controls, and additional taxes. The pound also followed the U.S. de jure de- 
valuation of the dollar on 20 December, keeping the same nominal parity but 
altering the gold content 7.89%. 
22. Jamaica  1967. Being a  member of  the  sterling area,  the  Jamaican 
pound was devalued on 21  November  1967 from  1.40 to  1.20 dollars per 
pound.  Thus,  the parity  of  2.00  Jamaican pounds  per pound  sterling was 
maintained. 
23. Korea 1960. On 23 February  1960, the exchange rate was devalued 
from 500.00 hwan per dollar to a new parity of 650.00 units to the dollar. In 
April, the government led by Rhee collapsed, and a new administration under 
Chang initiated a more comprehensive economic program. As  part of  this 
ambitious program, the multiple exchange rate system was reformed. On 2 
February 1961, an exchange rate of 1,250.00 hwan per dollar was established. 
A flexible certificate rate, initially fixed at 50.00 hwan per dollar, had to be 
added for all commercial and financial dealings. 
24. Korea 1964. The 1962 currency reform replaced ten hwan by one unit 
of the new currency, the won. After being elected in  1963, Park adopted an 
austerity plan to face inflationary and foreign exchange problems. On 10 Jan- 
uary 1964, all imports were subject to a surcharge of 50.00 won per dollar to 
be added to the effective rate of  130.00 units per dollar. On 3 May, a unitary 
floating system was established based on a rate of 255.00 won per dollar. 
25. Mexico 1954.  Mexico devalued its peso by raising the dollar value from 
8.65 to 12.50 pesos on 18 April 1954. 
26. Malawi 1967. Malawi was a member of the sterling area, and its pound 
was at par with sterling. It therefore dropped from 2.80 to 2.40 dollars per 
pound on 20 November 1967, in the midst of dropping exchange revenues and 
growing trade deficits. 
27. Nicaragua 1955. An extensive monetary reform, designed to improve 
the position of the Cordoba, took place on 1 July 1955. The basic official rate 
was devalued from 5.00 to 7.00 cordobas to the dollar, the export rate was 
kept, and other official rates were abolished. 
28. Pakistan 1955. The Pakistan rupee did not follow the pound  sterling 
and Indian rupee devaluations of  1949. It was  not until  1 August 1955 that 
Pakistan devalued her currency for the first time, when the official value was 
increased from 3.31 to 4.76 rupees to the dollar, at par with the Indian rupee. 
29. Peru 1958. External and internal pressures jeopardized the peg of 19.00 
soles per dollar maintained by the Central Bank in the fluctuating free market 
since 1949. On 22 January 1958, the Central Bank stopped intervening, forc- 
ing a de facto devaluation. Several attempts were made by Prado’s government 
to stabilize the soles at different levels during the year, and the value of  the 
dollar closed at 25.10 soles. Tax  hikes, import controls, and wage freezes 
were also implemented during the year. 
30. Peru  1967. The  1960 currency reform abolished the fluctuating ex- 
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rate. Belaunde’s expansive policies, together with collapsing export prices, 
put serious pressures on the soles. On 31 August 1967, the Central Bank with- 
drew its support from the exchange market, allowing the rate to jump from 
26.82 to 38.70 units to the dollar. The latter was the parity on 9 October, when 
the Central Bank began intervention in the newly created certificate market in 
a dual exchange system. These events occurred in the midst of  a full-fledged 
economic financial and political crisis, which ended with the 1968 military 
coup. 
31. Philippines  1962. In April 1960, a free rate was legalized to coexist 
with the official parity of 2.00 pesos per dollar. The initial free rate was set at 
3.20 pesos and later revalued to 3.00 pesos per dollar. On 22 January 1962, 
soon after his inauguration, Macapagal instituted an ambitious economic pro- 
gram of  monetary stability that included an exchange decontrol component. 
Exchange controls were relaxed, and a truly fluctuating free rate was estab- 
lished. The free rate closed 1962 at 3.70 pesos per dollar. However, the old 
parity of 2.00 pesos was maintained for some transactions. 
32. Philippines  1970. The official par value was raised from 2.00 to 3.90 
pesos in late 1965. To  cope with a currency that had deteriorated during the 
initial Marcos years, the Central Bank instituted a multiple rate structure on 
21 February 1970. This new structure was based on an official fluctuating free 
market rate or “guided” rate set initially at 5.50 pesos per dollar and mixed 
rates for exports and imports. In May, the mixed rate for exports was abol- 
ished. The “guided” rate closed 1970 at 6.435 pesos to the dollar. 
33. Sierra Leone 1967. The leone was a currency of the sterling area and 
followed the sterling devaluation on 22 November  1967. The leone depre- 
ciated from a value of  1.40 dollars to a new value of 1.20 dollars, maintaining 
the parity of 2.00 leones per pound sterling. 
34. Spain 1959. A  series of partial devaluations during the  1950s intro- 
duced a multiplicity of exchange rates while keeping an official par value of 
11.22 pesetas per dollar. An  extensive monetary reform was  finally imple- 
mented on 18 July 1959. The most important rate of the old system, the con- 
trolled free market rate, stood at 42.00 pesetas per dollar at the moment of the 
unification of all exchange rates at a parity of 60.00 pesetas to the dollar. An 
austerity program, including interest rate action, tight credit, and budget im- 
provements, was also adopted. 
35. Spain 1967. Facing increasing trade deficits and a drain of foreign ex- 
change, Spain followed the British devaluation on 20 November 1967. The 
dollar value was unexpectedly cut from 60.00 to 70.00 pesetas. 
36. Sri Lank 1967. Ceylon also followed the pound sterling devaluation 
on 22 November 1967. However, the reduction in the value of her rupee, from 
4.76 to 5.95 rupees per dollar, was higher than the depreciation of the British 
currency. The measure, together with increases in export duties and the ad- 
justment of  the domestic price of rice and  wages, was intended to help the 
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37. Trinidad and Tobago 1967. Along with the pound sterling, to which the 
Trinidad and Tobago dollar was linked at 4.80 dollars per pound, the Trinidad 
and Tobago dollar was devalued from 1.714 to 2.00 units to the U.S. dollar on 
23 November 1967. 
38. Tunisia 1964. In June  1964, France ended Tunisia’s privileged trade 
position as another retaliation in a war of trade restrictions and nationaliza- 
tions. Faced with no more French aid and with little official reserves, Bour- 
guiba’s government devalued the dinar on 28 September 1964. The parity was 
changed from 0.42 to 0.525 dinars per dollar and  was effected within the 
framework of a stabilization program. 
39. Turkey 1958. In a long history of currency deterioration, a partial de- 
valuation took place in 1956 with the introduction of the tourist lira (5.25 units 
per dollar), which would coexist with the official parity (2.80 liras per dollar). 
In  1958, a major economic reform program was implemented by  the Men- 
deres’s regime, including the freezing of credits, the control of public expend- 
itures, the temporary ban of imports, and the abolition of export subsidies. As 
a part of this plan, a selling exchange rate of 9.00 liras per dollar was created 
on 4 August while maintaining three buying rates (4.90, 5.60, and 9.00 liras 
per dollar). The basic rate of 2.80 was kept on the books and became inoper- 
ative until it was aligned with the effective rate of 9.00 liras per dollar in the 
de jure devaluation of August 1960. 
40. Turkey 1970. In the midst of  a profound financial economic crisis, the 
fourteen-nation Aid Consortium, which had  poured millions of  dollars into 
the country, threatened to cut off all foreign assistance. The lira was devalued 
on 3 August 1970, from 9.00 to 15.00 units to the dollar for almost all com- 
mercial and financial transactions, eliminating all other exchange categories. 
The economic crisis led to the coup d’ttat in March 1971, in which Demirel 
was deposed by the military. 
41. Uruguay 1959. The newly elected conservative National party began 
an austerity program to “save the peso” in  1959. A comprehensive monetary 
reform was undertaken on 15 December. The cumbersome system of multiple 
rates was replaced by a unified freely fluctuating exchange rate. The basic rate 
had been 1.52/2.10 pesos per dollar at the end of  1958, while the certificate 
rate closed 1958 at 4.10. The new free rate ended 1959 with a value of  11.10 
pesos per dollar. 
42. Uruguay 1963. Tight capital controls were imposed in 1963 in order to 
contain the flight from the peso. These were not enough, and eventually, on 9 
May, the Central Bank withdrew its peg of  10.95 pesos per dollar from the 
exchange market  and  temporarily  suspended all  private  foreign exchange 
dealings. On May 29, the Bank was back in the market at 16. W16.55 pesos 
per dollar and closed 1963 at 16.30/16.40. A new gold parity was also created 
just under  15.00 pesos to the dollar. The “free” market was  no  longer free 
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43. Uruguay 1971. The economic and political situation had become cha- 
otic, and, given the disturbances by the revolutionary group ’hpamaros’, Pa- 
checo Areco began to rule by  decree in  a state of  siege. Trade and capital 
controls were tightened, and, on 26 April 1971, a multiple exchange structure 
was established. The official rate of 250.00 pesos per dollar was kept for spe- 
cial transactions, while a surcharge of  50.00 pesos would apply to consular 
fees, 75.00 pesos for subsistence, and  100.00 for traveling. All  these sur- 
charges were revised upward several times during 1971. The rate for tradi- 
tional exports and most imports closed the year at 370.00 pesos per dollar, the 
rate for consular fees and subsistence at 500.00 pesos, and travel at 600.00 
pesos. In early 1972, the new government of  Bordaberry reformed the cur- 
rency system to a two-tier exchange market. 
44.  Venezuela 1964. Since 1962, Venezuela had  enjoyed a marked im- 
provement in its economic and financial conditions. On 18 January 1964, the 
newly elected Leoni administration implemented a major exchange reform 
that initiated a trend toward a unification of  the multiple rate system. Most 
transactions were moved from the controlled rate of  3.33/3.35 bolivars per 
dollar to an import rate of 4.494.50 bolivars, while the official free market 
was abolished. 
45. Yugoslavia 1961. For a number of reasons, the three Yugoslav deval- 
uations considered in this study fall in a somewhat different category than the 
rest of  our episodes. Although the country was  more liberalized than other 
Eastern European countries, central planning was still imposed in Yugoslavia, 
and ‘Iito’s government retained control of most prices and investment funds. 
On 1 January 1961, the currency structure was simplified. The settlement rate 
was devalued from 632.00 to 750.00 dinars per dollar and applied to most 
transactions, making the official 300.00 dinars rate inoperative. On 1 January 
1962, the tourist and diplomatic rates were aligned to the 750.00 dinars per 
dollar rate, unifying the exchange rate, except for some export premiums. 
46. Yugoslavia 1965.  The devaluation of 25 July 1965 was part of an exten- 
sive economic reform program that included trade liberalization, administra- 
tive simplification, and tight credit. The official rate of  750.00 dinars was 
devalued to 1,250.00 dinars per dollar after a temporary financial rate had 
been established earlier in the month. Beginning in January 1966 a hard dinar, 
equal to one hundred old dinars, was introduced. 
47. Yugoslavia 1971. Another overexpansion brought the economy to the 
crisis point. The expected devaluation of the dinar came to pass on 23 January 
1971, and the parity was increased from 12.50 to 15.00 dinars to the dollar. 
There was  also a price and wage freeze, and  finally the private sector was 
allowed to issue bonds. The dinar followed the floating of the dollar, but on 
21 December it was further devalued to a new official parity of  17.00 dinars 
per dollar. 
48. Zaire 1967. After several years of civil war, political unrest, and eco- 454  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
nomic troubles, the financial situation of the Congo became unsustainable. 
The Belgians cut off  their traditional aid as a retaliation for the nationalization 
of the copper mining company. Mobutu increased the official dollar rate on 24 
June  1967 from  150.00/180.00 to 500.00 Congo francs. Simultaneously, a 
new currency was introduced: the zaire, equal to one thousand Congo francs. 
References 
Agenor, P., and P.  Montiel.  1991. Exchange Rate Management and Credibility Issues 
in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: IMF. Mimeo. 
Aghevli, B., M. Khan, and P.  Montiel.  1991. Exchange Rate Policy in Developing 
Countries:  Some Analytical  Issues.  IMF Occasional  Paper  no.  78.  Washington, 
D.C. 
Alesina, A,, and A. Drazen. 1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American Eco- 
nomic Review 85(5):1170-88. 
Buira, A.  1983. IMF Financial Programs and Conditionality. Journal of Development 
Economics 12: 11 1-36. 
Burton, D., and M. Gilman. 1991. Exchange Rate Policy and the IMF. Finance and 
Development 28(3): 18-21. 
Conway, P.  1991. IMF Lending Programs: Participation and Impact.  University of 
North Carolina. Mimeo. 
Cooper, R. 1971a. Currency Depreciation in Developing Countries.  In Government 
and Economic Development,  ed. G. Ranis. New Haven,  Conn.:  Yale  University 
Press. 
. 1971b. Devaluation and Aggregate Demand in Aid Receiving Countries. In 
Trade, Balance  of  Payments  and  Growth, ed. J.  Bhagwati.  Amsterdam: North- 
Holland. 
. 1971c. Exchange Rate Devaluation  in Developing  Countries. Princeton Es- 
says in International Finance, no.  86. Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University, Inter- 
national Finance Section. 
Cukierman, A., S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini.  1992. Seigniorage and Political Insta- 
bility. American Economic Review (June). 
Dell, S.  1981. On  Being Grandmotherly: The Evolution ofIMF Conditionality. Prince- 
ton Essays in International Finance, no. 144. Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University, 
International Finance Section. 
Denoon, D. 1986. Devaluation under Pressure. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
de Vries, M., ed.  1976. The International Monetary Fund, 1966-1971.  Washington, 
. 1987. Balance of Payments Adjustment, 1945 to 1986: The IMF  Experience. 
Dornbusch,  R.  1991. Credibility and Stabilization. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 
Dornbusch,  R.,  and S. Fischer.  1986. Stopping Hyperinflations: Past and  Present. 
Edwards, S. 1988. Exchange Rate Misalignment in Developing Countries. Baltimore: 
. 1989a. Implications  of  Alternative  International  Exchange Rate  Arrange- 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
107(3):837-50. 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 122:  1-47. 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 455  Devaluation Controversies in the Developing Countries 
ments  for the Developing  Countries.  In New  Institutional Arrangements for the 
World Economy, ed. H. J. Vosgerau. Berlin: Springer. 
.  1989b. The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries: A Criti- 
cal Evaluation. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 3 1  :7-68. 
. 1989c. Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation and Adjustment: Exchange Rate 
Policy in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Edwards, S., and G. Tabellini. 1991a. Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in De- 
veloping  Countries.  Journal  of  International  Money  and  Finance  10(March) 
S 16448. 
. 1991b. The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Inflation in Developing 
Countries: An Empirical Analysis. University of California, Los Angeles. Mimeo. 
Eichengreen, B. 1990. Relaxing the External Constraint: Europe in the 1930s. Univer- 
sity of California, Berkeley. Mimeo. 
Guitih, M. 1981. Fund  Conditionality: Evolution of  Principles and Practices.  IMF 
Pamphlet Series, no. 38. Washington, D.C. 
Gylfason,  T.,  and M.  Radetzki.  1985. Does Devaluation Make Sense in the Least 
Developed Countries? Seminar Paper no.  314. University of  Stockholm, Institute 
for International Economic Studies. 
Haggard, S. 1986. The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund 
Facility. In The Politics of International Debt, ed.  M. Kahler. Ithaca, N.Y.:  Cornell 
University Press. 
Harberger, A.,  and S. Edwards.  1982. Lessons of Experience under Fixed Exchange 
Rates. In The Theory and Experience of Economic Development, ed. M. Gersovitz 
et al. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Horsefield,  K.,  ed.  1969.  The International  Monetary  Fund,  1945-1965.  3  vols. 
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
Kamin, S. 1988. Devaluation, External Balance, and Macroeconomic Pegormance: 
A Look at the Numbers. Princeton Essays in International Finance, no. 62 (August). 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, International Finance Section. 
Khan, M., and J. Lizondo.  1987. Devaluation, Fiscal Deficits and the Real Exchange 
Rate. World Bank Economic Review 1 (January):357-74. 
League of  Nations.  1946. The Course and  Control of Infation. Geneva: League of 
Nations. 
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini.  1990. Macroeconomics, Credibiliry and Politics. Lon- 
don: Harwood Academic. 
Sachs, J. D. 1989. Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Cri- 
sis. In Developing Country Debt and Economic Pegormance, vol.  1, The Interna- 
tional Financial System, ed. J. D. Sachs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Santaella, J.  199  1. Credibility Problems and External Enforcement of Stabilization 
Programs: Historical Experience from the 1920s. University of California, Los An- 
geles. Mimeo. 
Sargent, T.  1986. Rational Expectations andlnfation. New York: Harper & Row. 
SELA.  1986. El FMI, el Bunco Mundial y la crisis Latinoamericana.  Mexico City: 
Siglo XXI. 
Summers, R., and A. Heston.  1988. A New Set of  International Comparisons of Real 
Product and Price Levels: Estimates for 130 Countries,  1950-1985.  Review of In- 
come and Wealth 34( 1):  1-25. 
Taylor, C. L., and D. Jodice.  1983. World Handbook of Social and Political Indica- 
tors. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
Vaubel, R.  1986. A Public Choice Approach to International Organization. Public 
Choice 51:39-57. 456  Sebastian Edwards and Julio A. Santaella 
Comment  Stanley Fischer 
Sebastian Edwards and Julio A, Santaella have written an interesting and use- 
ful paper, with  a surprising result-that  the bulk of  the Bretton Woods-era 
nominal devaluations that they examine were successful both in depreciating 
the real as well as the nominal exchange rate and in  improving the current 
account, as much as three years after the devaluation. 
In addition, they show that devaluations supported by the IMF were on the 
whole more  successful than  those conducted  outside the Fund’s  auspices. 
Their a priori argument that Fund programs may be more successful because 
the Fund’s seal of approval increases the government’s credibility is not sup- 
ported by  the empirical results, which show no extra credibility effect from 
the Fund once the effect of policy variables is taken into account. It remains 
possible that the Fund’s presence-its  seal of approval and the constraints it 
imposed-gave  governments the ability to persist with policies that would not 
otherwise have been politically viable. 
Among other results, the support for orthodoxy provided by their empirical 
confirmation that expansionary macroeconomic policies destroy the effective- 
ness of nominal devaluations is reassuring. The reduced-form results that po- 
litical factors by  and large affect the success of devaluations in the expected 
way are also encouraging for the many who had confidently made such asser- 
tions without checking the regression evidence. 
In  my  comments, I will first raise questions about the results themselves 
and then discuss the broader context into which Edwards and Santaella have 
set the issue-the  operation of the Bretton Woods system and the inflationary 
bias of flexible exchange rates. 
Are These Results too Good to Be ’he? 
Whenever the empirical evidence agrees so comfortably with the conven- 
tional wisdom, it is time to be suspicious. Here are a few points where the 
robustness of the results should be checked. 
What is the population underlying the sample that is studied? These thirty- 
seven are all the devaluations, larger than  15%, during the Bretton Woods 
period for which data were available. The breakdown between IMF and non- 
IMF devaluations is highly correlated with that between Latin American and 
non-Latin American devaluations. Does this affect the results? For example, 
is the IMF more effective in  Latin America? Or is the IMF more needed in 
Latin America? Why are the countries that approach the IMF in more trouble 
to start with? Does negotiating with the Fund delay adjustment, or does the 
availability of  Fund resources delay adjustment? Does the fact that several 
devaluations are associated with the British devaluation of 1967 matter? 
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What about the control group? Not  enough information is provided about 
the control group. For instance, what countries are in the group? Nor is the 
control group exploited enough. For instance, given that devaluations were 
carried out in different years, it would be useful to try to account for year 
effects by  calculating how much a given variable, such as the real exchange 
rate, changed relative to the average change in that variable in that year for the 
control group countries. 
Can the probit analysis also be used to analyze what determines whether 
countries devalue? At present, the probit regression is used in examining what 
determines whether countries go to the IMF when they devalue, but it is not 
used to examine when countries choose to devalue. 
What results are due to selectivity bias? Some care has to be taken to avoid 
selectivity bias. For instance, the authors note that many of  the countries in 
the sample used exchange controls to attempt to avoid devaluations but that 
they were not successful. One cannot conclude from this that exchange con- 
trols are necessarily ineffective in preventing devaluations. 
The Broader Context 
Edwards and Santaella motivate the paper by referring both to criticisms of 
the IMF and to the question of whether flexible exchange rates have an infla- 
tionary bias. They partly answer critics of  the Fund by  showing that Fund- 
supported devaluations work on average. But the Fund’s critics also frequently 
complain that Fund programs are unnecessarily bad for growth. This criticism 
has to be set in context: the Fund is often called on when the domestic situa- 
tion is out of hand after a period of unsustainable growth; the Fund’s effect on 
a before-after basis may therefore look especially bad. A more careful look at 
the evidence will in all likelihood show that going to the Fund on average 
improves growth performance relative to two alternatives-devaluing  without 
Fund support and not adjusting at all. 
Devaluations do increase the price level. Those results are implicit in the 
paper, when the effectiveness index-which  measures the pass-through of de- 
valuation-is  studied. Domestic prices rise on average, but on average not by 
as much as the exchange rate. Further, the pass-through is on average less for 
the IMF-supported devaluers. 
Of  course,  this does not answer the question of  whether a floating rate 
system is inflationary. That has to be determined, not by examining the pass- 
through effects of individual devaluations, but rather by  examining the aver- 
age rates of  inflation under adjustable peg and floating rate regimes, respec- 
tively. Although causation is an obvious issue, there can be little doubt that a 
fixed rate or adjustable peg system constrains monetary policy more effec- 
tively than a floating rate regime. 
In examining exchange rate systems, we have to distinguish among three 
systems: floating rate, adjustable peg, and irrevocably fixed rates. Edwards 
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peg systems. They do not make the comparison between the performance of 
countries that adjusted their pegs and that of those that took the exchange rate 
commitment as sacrosanct, such as the franc-zone countries in Africa. The 
inflation performance of these countries has been excellent since 1946, when 
they fixed their exchange rates, and their growth performance was very good 
until the late 1970s. However, several of the CFA countries, particularly the 
CBte d’Ivoire, overexpanded during the late 1970s commodity booms and had 
to  adjust during the  1980s. But they did not adjust, and growth has been 
slower than that in  neighboring countries that were free to devalue. By  any 
reasonable analysis, the CFA  franc is  overvalued, domestic prices-espe- 
cially wages-are  declining too slowly, and the countries should devalue. 
The franc-zone experience both suggests the desirability of some exchange 
rate flexibility and reminds us that the real question about monetary arrange- 
ments is how they affect real economic performance. 
Comment  Albert Fishlow 
Sebastian Edwards and Julio Santaella have usefully looked at pre- 1973 IMF 
and non-IMF devaluations, applying a methodology already used by Edwards 
in previous work. They argue that there is a difference between IMF and non- 
IMF devaluing countries, with the former facing more serious crises than the 
latter. In addition, they find that IMF countries produced larger devaluations 
and experienced, on average, greater improvement in indicators of  external 
sector performance. Finally, an analysis of  the political economy of  failure 
seems to justify  some confidence that  democratic devaluers have a higher 
probability of success. 
While appreciative of the important contributions made by the paper in its 
extension of systematic analysis to the earlier period, I would like to question 
some of the key conclusions reached by the authors. 
In the first instance, I point to the inherent bias in the classification of coun- 
tries into IMF and non-IMF categories. This serves as a basic organizing prin- 
ciple of the paper. Yet  fully seven of twenty-two observations relating to non- 
IMF devaluations refer to the realignment of  sterling-based countries at the 
time of  the 1967 pound revaluation; by  contrast, fourteen of twenty-six IMF 
cases refer to Latin America, while only seven of  the twenty-two non-IMF 
situations do. In these circumstances, it is not at all clear what the contrast 
between IMF and non-IMF programs means. Are we simply measuring the 
seriousness of the crisis or contrasting Latin American devaluation episodes 
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with others? It might have been better to contrast the decisions of  the same 
countries when they follow IMF supervision with their practice when launch- 
ing their own programs of adjustment. 
In the second place, I note the attempt to specify IMF devaluing countries 
in table 8.7, seeking to differentiate these countries from the other devaluers 
by both economic and political characteristics. This exercise shows relatively 
weak results. Lagged net foreign assets alone can claim .05 levels of signifi- 
cance, with an inverse relation to democracy and relative GDP per capita next 
in order. This is telling us that nondemocratic poorer countries with a lack of 
reserves were more likely to utilize Fund programs. But the very lack of  im- 
portance of  exchange rate appreciation and deterioration of  the current ac- 
count must make one suspicious that this result is a consequence of the special 
set of IMF and non-IMF inclusions as noted above. Even the authors do not 
take the results fully seriously, as their own extensive subsequent attention to 
exchange rate depreciation shows. Indeed, there they maintain that macroeco- 
nomic policy plays a key role in adjustment programs. 
A third important subject addressed by  the paper is the attempt to under- 
stand the reasons for success or failure in these forty-eight devaluation expe- 
riences. The first requirement is a satisfactory classification of  the cases. I 
question here the criteria used. It is quite striking to see Brazil in 1967 classi- 
fied as a failure just prior to its rapid expansion in product a year later; equally, 
Peru in the same year is measured as a limited success although the program 
led to military intervention. And, as noted above, seven of  the sixteen suc- 
cessful devaluations recorded for the non-IMF group were revaluations re- 
quired by devaluation of the pound in  1967. 
In the second place, I wonder whether the subsequent political economy 
analysis of  “successful” devaluation, treating limited successes equally with 
full ones, leads us as fully to a defense of democracy as the authors suggest. 
No variables are statistically significant in the two probit analyses reported in 
table 8.15, and that of democratic form has the lowest r-value, .627, in equa- 
tion (2).  This would seem a weak basis for asserting that, “in order to ‘put the 
house in order’ and in implementing adjustment programs based on financial 
discipline, there is no need to eschew democracy.” Note, moreover, that the 
measure of coups now has the highest, but insignificant, negative value: suc- 
cessful devaluation is negatively associated with the frequency of coups. But, 
as we  saw earlier, there was  a positive coefficient between coups and IMF 
programs. Are we getting back anything here except the predominant classi- 
fication of IMF programs as failure? 
Edwards and Santaella conclude by contrasting the Bretton Woods regime 
with what came after. They attempt to assess whether the movement to ex- 
change rate flexibility reduced the costs of adjustment without affecting infla- 
tion. As they point out, however, the two periods are startlingly different in 
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makes the question of the IMF system perhaps secondary to the oil shocks and 
other changes in the  1970s and  1980s. Such a comparison may tell us rela- 
tively little about the change in exchange rate policy. 
I have tried to focus in this Comment on differences with the authors in 
order to encourage still further analysis of this Bretton Woods period. I would 
be remiss, however, not to conclude by  recognizing the important advances 
that they have already made in focusing on this first period of IMF adjustment 
in the way they have done. 
General Discussion 
William Branson characterized the system before  1973 as one with a nomi- 
nally fixed exchange rate at the center and periodic nominal and real devalua- 
tions at the periphery. After 1971, it was a system with nominal and real float- 
ing at the center and pegging to baskets of currencies by the periphery. Stanley 
Black pointed out that, because the study focuses on the pre-1971 period, it is 
biased  in  favor of  finding successful devaluations because devaluation was 
more likely to be successful in the stable environment of the Bretton Woods 
system. Willem Buiter argued that whether countries did or did not go to the 
IMF may be explained by  factors not captured by  the regressions, such as 
world economic conditions and global interest rates. 
Alan Stockman raised the issue that large changes in  real exchange rates 
seem to have only small effects on quantity variables such as the current ac- 
count balance, output, and employment. Michael Mussa said that this was an 
example of Stigler’s law, that all measured elasticities are small. He cited his- 
torical examples of significant effects on the current account of changes in real 
exchange rates that are not well explained by the econometrics. 